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FEDERAL PRICE CONTROL OF NATURAL GAS
SOLD TO INTERSTATE PIPELINES
CONSUMERS throughout the country buy natural gas that flows from a burner
tip1 after an interstate pipeline journey of hundreds of miles from producing
fields. 2  Local distributing companies sell this gas at rates that generally are
subject to ceiling control by the consuming states. A large part of these end
rates covers the wholesale purchase of gas from interstate pipelinesP at maxi-
mum rates set by the Federal Power Commission. The pipelines' rates in turn
often include the cost of gas bought from big oil and gas companies, the "in-
dependent" or non-affiliated producers.4 No ceiling has been placed on these
independents' prices.
During the last decade, however, a controversy has been brewing over
whether the FPC has the power to extend maximum price control to inde-
pendents' sales to interstate pipelines. Because its members have not been able
to agree that they have such authority, the Commission has not yet sought to
1. In June, 1950 there were an estimated 12,700,000 residential and 1,140,000 commer-
cial and industrial users of straight natural gas. There were also about 9,600,000 users of
manufactured and mixed (manufactured and natural) gas. SURVEY OF CURRENT BUsINESS
S-26 (U. S. Dep't Comm., Oct. 1950).
There has been an increase of over fifty per cent in the number of straight natural gas
consumers since 1946, when utilities supplied 8,700,000 customers in 34 states. Then nearly
two-thirds of the total number, however, were in California, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania,
and Texas. Besides utility customers, some 3,500,000 homes, mostly in rural areas, used
bottled liquid petroleum gas in 1946. FPC, DOCKET No. G-580 NATURAL GAS INVESTIGA-
TIoN 398-9 (Smith-Wimberly Report 1948) (hereinafter cited as SMITH-WIMBIERLY REP.).
Most of the domestic gas consumption is for cooking and to a lesser extent water heat-
ing, but the use of gas for space heating is growing rapidly. See SMITu-WIMERILY REP.
400-6; N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1950, § 3, p. 1, col. 4.
2. There are no figures on the number of domestic customers using natural gas that
comes from other states. But approximately a third of the marketed production of natural
gas is transmitted through pipelines in interstate commerce, see p. 1470 infra, and resi-
dential use accounts for about a third of utility sales, see note 126 infra.
For a recent map of the country's major natural gas pipelines see Hearings before Sub-
committee of Senate Committee ont Interstate Commerce on S. 1498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,
facing 360 (1949).
3. There are no figures for the average price the distributing companies pay to pipe-
lines for gas delivered at the city gates. In 1949 the Detroit wholesale rate was about 20
cents; New York's about 30 cents. See Hearings before Subcommittee of House Coin-
mittee on Interstate Commerce on H.R. 79, 1758, and 982, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 264-5
(1949).
For a graphic analysis of pipeline transmission costs at various load factors, see Smrru-
WIMBERLY REP. 265.
4. While most of the interstate pipelines produce part of their gas requirements, they
are buying an increasing share from independent producers. See pp. 1485-86 infra, The
prices for these purchases vary widely. See note 100 in!ra. In the chief producing area of
the southwest purchase prices averaged 4.65 cents per thousand cubic feet in 1947, see p.
1486, infra, or approximately 8 per cent of the average domestic rate. See note 192 ifra.
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assert it. But the fear that the Commission might try to regulate them led gas
producers, starting in 1947, to ask Congress to write a hands-off policy into
statute.
Meanwhile, in the face of a booming postwar demand for natural gas, there
has been a sharp upswing in the prices paid by interstate pipelines in the im-
portant southwest producing region. Aroused at the prospect that unchecked
increases will mean higher gas bills,5 spokesmen for consumers have argued that
the FPC now has the power to regulate sales by independents to interstate
pipelines. 6
Consumer and producer interests clashed last spring over the Kerr bill
which would have explicitly barred FPC jurisdiction over independents' sales.
President Truman's veto, unchallenged by Congress, may now encourage the
FPC to attempt to regulate the independents' prices.
Amidst all the clamor, however, except for brief congressional hearings and
debate,7 there has been no study of the problem whether independents' sales
to interstate pipelines should be regulated.8 Placing this issue in perspective
requires first a consideration of existing government regulation of the natural
gas industry.
There are three steps in supplying natural gas to its 14 million users.0 In
the first step, production and gathering, gas is drawn from the earth, often
along with oil.' 0 It is gathered in by a netvork of field pipes and processed
to remove both nuisances and valuable by-products. 1 ' Much of this gas is
5. See, for example, 96 CONG. REc. 4263 (Mar. 28? 1950) (remarks of Sen. Douglas of
Illinois). Consumers' rates had dropped slightly from 1939 to 1947. Hearings, stpra note
2, at 362.
6. See, for eoxample, Hearings, supra note 2, at 457, 459, 460 (City Solicitor, Pitts-
burgh, Pa.) ; Hearings, supra note 3, at 160 (City Council, Kansas City, Mo.) ; id. at 280
(National Institute of Municipal Law Officers).
7. Hearings, supra note 2; Hearings, supra note 3; Supplemental Hearings before
Subcommittee of House Committee on Interstate Conmerce on H. R. 79, 1758, and 982,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). For the debates see 96 CONG. RIc. 3406-4285 passim (Mar.
15-28, 1950).
8. In 1945-6 the FPC conducted a detailed investigation of the competition of natural
gas with other fuels. SMITH-WVIMBERLY REP. 1-2. For the background of this study see
note 248 infra. The Commission announced at the outset that it did not seek to expand its
jurisdiction over independent producers. SssrTWIssBERLY RE . 165-6. In spite of this
assurance the hearings became a forum for pipeline-producers angered by FPC regulation
and independents fearful of it. At the end of its investigation the Commission issued tv.,o
reports. Both gave considerable attention to the pipelines' case but scarcely any to the
independents'. Nevertheless two Commissioners hinted that perhaps the independents
should be regulated. FPC, DocKEr No. 6-580 NATURAL GAS IN.VESTzGAT.0 158 (Draper-
Olds Report 1948) (hereinafter cited as DaAPER-OLus Rn'.). The other tw.o Commis-
sioners saw no need for this. S=TH-WnmmLY REP. S.
9. See note 1 supra.
10. DEGOLYER (ed.), ELEMENTS OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 433 (1940).
11. Natural gas contains liquid-forming components which, on condensing, cause
trouble with pipeline meters and other equipment. SmrrH-1VIMBEnLY REP. 92. Process-
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then used by the producers themselves as fuel in drilling and pumping opera-
tions.12 And much is sold to nearby industrial plants. 13 All told, about a third
of the total marketed production is consumed right in the field. 14 The other
two-thirds of the marketed gas moves into pipelines 1r for the second big op-
eration of the industry, long-distance transmission to consumers. About half
this volume is consumed within the producing states themselves.10 Part of
the total amount of pipeline gas-whether consumed inside or outside the
producing states-is sold directly to individual industrial plants.17 The rest
is passed on to distributing companies for the third operation of the gas busi-
ness, resale through local mains to household, commercial and industrial
users.18
In broad outline, there has developed within the natural gas industry and
paralleling its tripartite structure, three separate sectors of government con-
trol: (1) production is controlled by the states; (2) intrastate transmission
and local distribution are also regulated by the states; and (3) interstate trans-
mission is regulated by the federal government through the FPC.
STATE REGULATION OF THE NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY
Control of production
At the producing end of the natural gas industry, state regulation has been
ing the gas yields valuable natural gasoline and heavier hydrocarbons, and gets rid of water
vapor and sulfur compounds. Id. at 89-101.
12. This "field use" accounts for about 23.5 per cent of natural gas consumption. Id.
at 364. 0
13. About 11 per cent of marketed production, see note 14 infra, is used in the pro-
ducing fields for the manufacture of carbon black, an ingredient of inks and rubber com-
pounds. Id. at 365-7.
14. Marketed production is gross production less gas returned to the reservoir, see
note 25 in!ra, and loss and waste. SMITH-WIMBERLY REP. 105, Table 3. In 1946 this
marketed production totalled about 4 trillion cubic feet. Ibid.; id. at 360, Table 2. Con-
sumption in the field included 960 billion cubic feet for "field uses", see note 12 supra, and
478 billion cubic feet for the manufacture of carbon black, which is carried on chiefly in the
producing fields. SMITH-WIMBERLY REP. 365. Id. at 360, Table 2.
15. SMITH-WI].fBERLY REP. 247, Table 2.
16. Ibid.
17. Reported statistics do not distinguish between the volume of gas sold direct to
industry by pipelines and that sold by local distributing companies, nor between direct in-
dustrial sales made within the producing states and those made in other states.
Direct pipeline industrial sales are heavy in the southwest. In 1948, for example, the
Interstate Nat. Gas Co. sold 74 billion cubic feet to industry and 47 to other utilities. FPC
STATISTICS OF NAT. GAS COMPANIES 1948, 109. Cities Service sold 56 billion to industry
as against 114 billion to utilities. Id. at 104.
Pipelines serving northern markets sell a smaller proportion of their gas direct to in-
dustry. In 1948 the Northern Natural Gas Co. sold 18 billion cubic feet to industry and
114 billion to utilities. Id. at 116. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. sold none to industry
and 118 billion cubic feet to utilities. Id. at 123.
18. Residential and commercial use accounts for about one-third and industrial use for
two-thirds of the natural gas marketed through pipelines. SMITn-WIMBERLY REP. 410.
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undertaken, and justified legally, as a conservation measure.1 0 A fourth of the
country's gas is pooled in the ground with oi20 and furnishes pressure which
lifts this oil to the surface.21 In the absence of a market for this casinghead gas,
it is frequently blown in the air or burned at the wellhead. 2 2 As recently as
1945 a fifth of the country's total gas production was lost in this way.P
Alarmed both at the effect that this loss of a pressure source will have on
ultimate oil recovery and at the waste of an ideal fuel, states have limited the
oil output of wells producing an excessive amount of gas2 4 and have forbidden
the blowing of gas in the air.-
The pipelines' main gas supply comes, however, from dry gas fields where
production is geared to the demand for gas rather than to the demand for
oil.26 As in the oil fields, reckless exploitation was long encouraged by the
19. The most comprehensive surveys of the development of state production control of
gas and oil are Am. BAR Ass'N SEC. OF MIN. LAW, LEGAL HISTORY OF CONSERVATION or
OIL AND GAS (1938), and Am. BAR Ass'N SEC. OF Mm. LAW, CONSERVATION OF OIL
AND GAS-A LEGAL HISroRY (1948). An excellent concise account of gas waste 15 years
ago and state attempts to check it, is found in SEN. Doec. No. 92, PT. 84-A, 70th Cong., 1st
Sess. 86-110 (FTC Utility Corporations Rep. 1935).
20. SMITH-WIMBERLY REP. 35.
21. Id. at 70-1.
22. Id. at 70.
23. Id. at 114.
24. E.g., TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 6008, § 3(a) (Vernon 1949). See Adninisfratlion
of Gas-Oil Ratio Limitations, ImNRaEsTAm OIL CopAcr Q. BuLL. 97 (Dec. 1947). But
restricting a producer's output in this way merely keeps more oil and gas in the common
pool to be drained off by a neighbor. See Knowlton, The Protection of Correlative Rights
as a Limitation of Regulation of Oil-Gas Ratios, INTERSTATE OIL ComAcT Q. BuLL. 34,
35 (Mlay 1948). The solution of the conflict between conservation and surface owners'
property rights appears to lie in unit operation of the fields. Id. at 35. See p. 1474
infra.
25. In recent years the Te.xas Railroad Commission, for example, has prohibited the
blowing of casinghead gas in a number of fields. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 36-65.
Such a prohibition gives producers three choices:
(1) Shutting down their wells. See Murray, Natural Gas Problems in Territory of
Greatest Reserves, Au. GAS As's'N, NAT. GAS DEP'T, PRocEEDINGS 10, 13 (1949).
(2) Pumping gas back into the oil reservoir to maintain pressure. Repressuring and
pressure maintenance of oil reservoirs are explained in SuIrr-WImERLY RiP. 76-8. See
also id. at 105 (table showing gas returned to formation).
(3) Selling casinghead gas to the pipelines, which are now absorbing such gas in in-
creasing amounts. BuR. MINES, MINERALS YEaoRBoO 811 (1948). See also Duff, Four-
Year Natural Gas Program to Cost Nearly Two Billion, OIL & GAS. J. 229 (Jan. 27,
1949); Weber, Huge Gas-Conservation Project Now in Initial Operation Stage, OIL &
GAS J. 60 (July 8, 1948) ; Kayser, Flare Gas and Its Relation to Reserves, Au . GAS Ass'N,
NAT. GAS DEP'T PROCEEDINGS 13, 14 (1948) ; Hearings, stpra note 2, at 310.
26. The Hugoton field, extending from southwest Kansas across the Oklahoma pan-
handle into Texas, and the Panhandle field in northern Texas, are the country's largest dry
gas fields. SMITH -WIMBERLY REP. 40.
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rule of law holding that gas, like a wild animal, belonged to its captor.2 7 The
rule of capture put the independent producer in a dilemma. If he chose not to
produce gas immediately it was apt to be sucked from under his feet by a
neighbor whose well tapped the reservoir extending under both their lands. 8
To protect himself against this drainage the independent had to drill an off-
set well and bring up all the gas he could.2 9 Then he met the other horn of
the dilemma. Unlike oil, gas could not feasibly be stored above ground, and
could be transported from the field to market only through costly pipelines.8 0
Since initially the pipelines produced much of their gas requirements,0 1 they
were under no pressure to buy from independents.3 2 Many producers, there-
fore, sold their gas at virtually giveaway prices to nearby carbon black plants, 0
and some simply let the gas blow in the air, hoping in time to bring up oil."i
Producing states soon passed statutes forbidding physical waste of dry gas.85
And most of them have restricted the use of gas for the manufacture of carbon
black.3 6 But enforcement of these prohibitions would close down wells of
producers without pipeline connections and permit drainage from under their
lands. The states have therefore sought to force the pipelines to take gas
from the independents as well as from their own reserves.37
The earliest move was through statutes declaring the pipelines to be com-
mon purchasers who must buy gas without discriminating among producers.0 8
27. See Hardwicke, The Ride of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and
Gas, 13 TEx. L. REv. 391 (1935).
28. NAT'L RESOURCES COMMITTEE, ENERGY RESOURCES AND NAT'L POLICY 186
(1939). See also Oliver & German, Changes Needed in Oil Ownership Law, 30 OIL &
GAS J. 15 (Jul. 23, 1931).
29. SEN. Doc. No. 92, PT. 84A, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 181-2 (FTC Utility Corpora-
tions Rep. 1935).
30. Id. at 128-9.
31. Id. at 160-4.
32. See id. at 132, 184-195.
33. SMITH-WIMBERLY REP. 369.
34. SEN. Doc., supra note 29, at 88; Au. BAR. ASS'N SEC. OF MIN. LAW, LEGAL His-
TORY OF CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS 136-7 (1938). Later the producers extracted
the natural gasoline before letting the gas blow away. Ibid.
35. A-t. BAR ASS'N, op. cit. supra note 34, at 112 (Oklahoma 1905) ; id. at 269 (Texas
1899) ; id. at 61 (Louisiana 1906).
36. E.g., LA. ACTS 1922, No. 91, § 1-8, LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4811-4818 (Dart 1949).
In 1941 Texas prohibited the use of "sour" gas for manufacturing carbon black unless the
natural gasoline was taken out. TEx. ACTS 1941, p. 117, c. 91, § 2, TEx. CIv. STAT., Art.
6008, § 7 (2) (Vernon 1949). See SMITH-WIMBERLY REP. 371.
37. For an excellent account of the conflict between the pipelines and the independent
producers in Texas during the 'thirties, see Am. BAR Ass'N SEC. OF MIN. LAW, LEGAL
HISTORY OF CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS 270-86 (1938).
38. Oklahoma was first in 1913. OxLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 52, § 23 (1937). Texas fol.
lowed in 1931. TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 6049a, § 8a (Vernon 1949). Recently Michigan
enacted a common purchaser statute for gas pipelines. MICH. ANN. STAT. § 13,138(27)
(Rice Cum. Supp. 1949).
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These statutes, however, failed to define "discrimination," and did not es-
tablish any mechanism for determining when a pipeline was purchasing a fair
share from any producer. Moreover the constitutionality of such a statute has
been in doubt.3 9
The states therefore adopted the additional device of prorationing.40 At
periodic hearings before state commissions, purchasers of gas from a common
pool make "nominations" of the amount they expect to buy during the en-
suing period. In order to meet this "market demand," the commission then
sets a production quota for the pool. This quota, in turn, is broken down into
"allowables" for each well, determined according to complicated formulae
that take into account such factors as acreage per well and flow pressure."
Since this tactic necessarily limits the amount of gas a pipeline may produce
from its own wells, the states hope to force the pipelines to meet their require-
ments by purchasing gas from independents.
39. The Texas common purchaser statute, supra note 38, was held to violate the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Texoma Nat. Gas. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n,
59 F.2d 750, 753 (W.D. Tex. 1932) (no appeal taken). This led Texas to turn to the
device of prorationing. See note 40 infra.
In the first case involving the enforcement of the Oklahoma statute, mspra note 38, the
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because the judgment of the Oklahoma Supreme Court
lacked finality. Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62 (1948).
40. E.g., OKL. STAT. AN., tit. 52, § 239 (1937); TE%. Crv. STAT. Am., art. 6003,
§§ 10-20, art. 6049d, §§ 4, 6 (Vernon 1949). Prorationing legislation is on the statute books
of 11 states. See SmITH-WImBERLY REP., chart facing 12S.
While oil prorationing has been practiced since the 'thirties, prorationing in the dry
gas fields has developed largely in the last decade. Kansas started prorationing in its part
of the great Hugoton field in 1940. Am. BAR Ass'N SEC. OF MIN. LAw, CONSEnVATION
OF OIL AID GAs-A LEGAL HISTORY 176 (1948). Oklahoma began in the Hugoton field
in 1945, id. at 404, and Texas in 1948. Texas Part of Hugoton Gas Field Put Under Com-
mission Proration, OIL & GAS J. 57 (Sept. 30, 1948).
41. For an illustration of state gas prorationing see the explanation of Kansas and
Oklahoma procedure in Dahlgren, The Hugoton Gas Field, INTEfRSTATE OIL CoMPACT
Q. BULL. 203, 207-10 (June 1945).
Oil prorationing generally starts with a determination of a state-xide allowable which
is then broken down among various fields and further subdivided among wells. See, for
example, the discussion of Oklahoma procedure in Am. BAR Ass'n, op. cit. supra note 40,
at 373-4. In their dry gas prorationing the states so far have been content to fix allow-
ables separately for each field. The future may see a trend toward state-wide inter-pool
allocation of production for dry gas as well as for oil. See Murray, Natural Gas Problems
in the Territory of Greatest Reserves, Am. GAs Ass'N, NAT. G.S DEP'T, PROCEEDI -GS
10, 15 (1949).
For a discussion of the methods of allocating fractions of a field's quota to individual
wells, see INTERSTATE OIL COmPACT Q. BULL. 66 (Dec. 1949).
42. See Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55 (1937), in which
the Court upheld an injunction against enforcement of a prorationing order directed at a
pipeline producing its own gas. But the Supreme Court of Texas has since upheld gas
prorationing. Corzelius v. Harrell, 143 Tex. 509, 186 S.W2d 961 (1945).
A recent survey of regulatory practices in the dry gas fields is published in the Iurml-
STATE OIL COMPACT Q. BULL. 61 (Dec. 1948).
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But these measures leave untouched another problem: the needless invest-
ment in wells and the dissipation of reservoir energy that results from allowing
each surface owner to drill no matter how small his tract.43 In fact, both the
common purchaser and proration statutes encourage owners to drill more than
the optimum number of wells in order to get a larger share of the quota for the
pool. For this problem well spacing statutes 4 are only a partial solution.
Under spacing rules, unnecessary and improperly placed wells may still be
drilled.4 5 Engineers therefore agree that maximum recovery at minimum
cost can only be had by operating each reservoir as a unit.40 Several states
have taken half steps in this direction, by allowing landowners to pool their
surface interests into committee-run units for drilling purposes4  And in
1945 Oklahoma adopted a statute providing for compulsory unitization of a
common reservoir on the application of the owners of a majority of the surface
acres.48 Gradually the ideal of pool Unitization is making headway.
Regulation of distribution and intrastate transmission
At the distributing end of the natural gas industry, state regulation has
concerned itself primarily with rate making to protect consumers from mono-
polistic price practices. 49 For consumers of natural gas, like users of manu-
factured gas and electricity, are tied to a single supplier. To prevent the waste-
ful building of overlapping lines,"° muncipalities and later state commissions"t
have made regulated monopolies of single distributing companies.62
43. See King, Pooling and Unitization of Oil and Gas Leases, 46 MICH. L. Rav. 311
(1948) ; Myers, Spacing, Pooling and Field Wide Unitization, 18 Miss. L.J. 267 (1947).
In 1938 it was estimated that the cost of drilling of unnecessary wells ran between $80
million and $100 million per year. Ely, The Conservation of Oil, 51 HARV. L. REv. 1232-3
(1938).
44. These statutes authorize the regulatory agency to prescribe surface tracts of uni-
form size and shape on which only a single well may be drilled. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 52, § 87.1 (Cum. Supp. 1949).
45. See Jacobs, Unit Operation of Oil and Gas Fields, 57 YALE L.J. 1207, 1209 (1948).
46. See id. at 1210.
47. E.g., Micir. STAT. ANN. § 13.138(20) (Rice Cum. Supp. 1949); N. M. STAT. § 69-
213 (1942). These statutes permit the state commissions to form compulsory drilling units
if gas is being wasted. Louisiana provides for the compulsory formation of drilling units
without a finding of w.aste. LA. GEN. STAT. §§ 4741.18-4741.19 (Dart Supp. 1949).
48. OxLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 52, § 286.4 (Cum. Supp. 1949).
49. See TROXEL, EcoNoMIcs OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 213 (1947).
50. See id. at 28; BONBRIGHT, PUBLIC UTILITIES AND THE NATIONAL POWER POLI-
CIEs 7 (1940).
51. By 1948 all but seven states had commission regulation of gas and electric
utilities. FPC, STATE COMMISSION JURISDICTION AND REGULATION OF ELECTRIC AND
GAS UTILITIES 2, 16 (1948). For a history of the decline of local regulation and the shift
to control by state commissions since the early part of the century, see TROXEL, op. d. su-
pra note 49, cc. 3, 4.
52. A utility is seldom granted the exclusive right to serve a particular area, but the
common practice is to allow only one company to do so. See id. at 194. Before 1900 local
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While protecting consumers, courts and rate boards have also sought to per-
mit utility earnings sufficient to cover operating costs plus a fair return on the
company's property.53 The actual dollar amount-or rate base-on which the
return was to be made was originally the "fair value of the [utility] property."'
How to determine this "fair value" has preoccupied rate makers and courts for
two generations. 5
governments often relied on competition to control utility earnings, prices and service
standards. In 1895, for example, Duluth, Minnesota, had five competing electric companies.
Id. at 38. See also BARNES, THE EcoNomics OF PUiLIC UTILITY REGULV To 163-9
(1942). Some communities, like Pittsburgh, for example, are still served by more than
one gas utility. MooDY's, PUBLIc UrnLrIEs 76 (1949). But these companies operate
under regulation rather than competition. See FPC, op. cit. mspra note 51, at 16.
53. See BARNES, op. cit. supra note 52, at 314-15.
54. Courts were long hesitant to scrutinize rates set by legislatures. In Munn v. Illi-
nois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), the Supreme Court refused to review the state fixing of grain
warehouse rates, pointing out that rate making was a legislative, not a judicial, function.
Several years later, in Stone v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307 (1886), the
Court suggested in a dictum that it would review rates if the legislature had fixed them
in bad faith.
A theory and formula for judicial review emerged in full bloom in Smyth v. Ames, 169
U.S. 466 (1898), where the Court, in passing on railroad rates set by Nebraska, flatly as-
serted for the first time its right to review state-fixed rates. The Court stated its formula
thus: "[T]he basis of all calculations of rates ... must be the fair value of the property
being used for the convenience of the public. ... What the company is entitled to ask is
a fair return on [that] value. . . !' Id. at 546-7.
For a discussion of this early history see Barron, Evolution of Smyth v. Ames, 28 VA.
L. R.v. 761 (1942). See also BARNES, op. cit. supra note 50, at 314-15.
55. In Smyth v. Ames the Supreme Court said that in determining "fair value" such
factors should be considered as "the original cost of construction, the amount expended in
permanent improvements, the amount and market value of [the company's] bonds and
stocks, the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earn-
ing capacity of property under particular rates set by statute, and the sum required to meet
operating expenses...." 169 U.S. 466, 546-7 (1898). One commentator has pointed out
that operating expenses have no relation to a measure of value of the utility property.
BARNES, op. cit. supra note 52, at 378.
This Supreme Court statement as it stood never became a rate making formula. But
from the Court's insistence on the "fair value" test there evolved two different concepts of
"cost" which, if not synonymous with "fair value," are often regarded as more or less sig-
nificant "evidence" of it. The first concept is what the utility property actually cost.
This embraces the cost of the property to the person who first devoted it to public use
("original cost"), its cost of acquisition by the company whose rates were under consider-
ation and, where the company's books were sloppily kept, a best guess as to what the prop-
erty did cost (sometimes called "historical cost"). The second concept is what it would
-cost to replace the utility property ("reproduction cost"). At various times one and then
the other of these concepts have dominated the courts' and commissions' attempt to find
"fair value."
A third concept has been gaining headway since the mid-twenties, not as one of the
"evidences" of "fair value" but as a substitute for the "fair value" rate base. This yard-
stick is what the utility property should have cost if its owners had spent visely ("prudent
investment").
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An auxiliary problem, to which rate makers have paid far less attention, is
what property to include in the rate base. Where the utility purchases raw
materials at arm's length on the open market, the property of independent
suppliers is obviously not part of the utility's rate base. All utilities are al-
lowed to include the price paid as an operating expense.50 And where an
electric or manufactured gas company owns a source of raw materials, such as
a coal mine, this property is usually not included in the rate base. The utility
merely recovers the going price for the raw materials as an operating expense.0 7
Natural gas companies, on the other hand, receive different treatment. Where
the production, transmission and distribution of gas are carried on by a single
company or by affiliates within one state, rate makers in effect lump the whole
system into a rate base for determining local ratesY8
For an excellent history of this development see BARNES, op. Cit. supra note 50, at 370-
403. See also Mr. Justice Brandeis, concurring, in Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Conum'n,
262 U.S. 276, 289-94, 294 n.6 (1923) ; Hale, The Fair Value Merry-Go-Round, 33 ILL. L.
REv. 517 (1939).
The "fair value" rate base was required by the Supreme Court in 1898 to satisfy the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
The Court in 1943 discredited the "fair value" concept and held that compliance with the
Fifth Amendment does not require any specific rate making formula. FPC v. Hope Nat.
Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1943). Nevertheless many states have continued to use "fair value."
FPC, op. cit. supra note 51, at 8.
56. E.g., East Ohio Gas Co. v. City of Cleveland, 27 P.U.R. (N.S.) 387, 394, 414-17,
424 (Ohio 1939) (natural gas purchases from independents); Re Customers of Edison Elec.
Illum. Co., 5 P.U.R. (N.S.) 369, 372-4 (Mass. 1934) (electric company's purchase of coal);
Re Pub. Serv. Gas Co., P.U.R. 1922C, 493, 502-4 (N.J. 1922) (manufactured gas com-
pany's purchase of oil).
If a utility pays more than the "going" price for its fuel, the excess is disallowed. E.g.,
Re Citizens Mutual Heating Co., P.U.R. 1924A, 783, 785-6 (Ind. 1923) (coal purchases).
The most obvious current recognition of fuel expenditures as operating expenses is the
"fuel adjustment" clause being written into local utility rate schedules. These clauses tie
the retail rates to changing fuel prices. E.g., Re Haverhill Gas Lt. Co., 79 P.U.R. (N.S.)
423, 426-7 (Mass. 1948) (manufactured gas company); Re Conn. Lt. & Power Co., 44
P.U.R. (N.S.) 65, 68 (Conn. 1942) (electric and manufactured gas company). See also
McQuillen, Current Developments in Electric Rate Making, 42 Pun. UTIL. FORT. 620
(1948); Re Uniform Fuel Clause for Elec. Companies, 54 P.U.R. (N.S.) 57 (Conn. 1944).
57. E.g., Re Rainier & Elgin, P.U.R. 1921C, 121, 131 (Tenn. 1921).
58. Where a single company is producer, transporter and distributor, all its property is
usually included in one rate base for the purpose of setting local rates. E.g., Re United
Fuel Gas Co., P.U.R. (N.S.) 1920C, 583, 585, 587 (W.Va. 1919).
More often these functions are split among affiliated corporate entities: One company
may produce, transport, and sell gas wholesale to different distributing companies which in
turn sell to local consumers. Faced with this setup the states usually first put the producer-
transporter's property into a rate base and fix his wholesale rates. E.g., State v. Lone Star
Gas Co., 86 S.W.2d 484, 11 P.U.R. (N.S.) 283, 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935), ree/d on other
grounds, 304 U.S. 224 (1938). The next step is to fix rates for each distributing company,
allowing as an operating expense the wholesale purchase price paid to the affiliated pipe-
line, and allowing also a return on the distributing company's own rate base. E.g., Re Com-
munity Nat. Gas Co., 15 P.U.R. (N.S.) 149, 163, 164, 167 (Tex. 1936) (affiliate of Lone Star
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State rate control could be effective as long as natural gas distributors and
their sources of supply were located within the same state. But the consum-
ing states ran into trouble as their local utilities began to draw increasing
volumes of gas from pipelines that stretched out to producing fields in other
states. Where these interstate pipelines were affiliated with local distributing
companies the consuming states could compel the local company to prove the
reasonableness of its pipeline purchase price at the peril of having it dis-
allowed as an operating expense.59 As a practical matter, however, the states
had difficulty getting the records of companies located outside their borders
in order to check on costs.G0 And where the local distributing company bought
its gas from a non-affiliated interstate pipeline, state regulation of the whole-
sale price was forbidden as a burden on interstate commerce.0 1 A forliorarli
the consuming state could not reach beyond the pipeline and regulate the price
Gas Co., supra). In effect, therefore, the local distributor's rates are fixed by a rate base
method that reaches back to the producing property.
The alternative to including natural gas producing property in the rate base is to allow
the gas company the "going" price for gas as operating expense, as is done with electric and
manufactured gas companies which own their sources of fuel supply. Cf. Pennsylvania
Power & Lt Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 193 At. 427, 19 P.U.I. (N.S.) 433, 441-3 (Pa.
Super. Ct 1937).
- Neither commissions nor courts have discussed the reasons for compensating utilities
for natural gas production through the rate base rather than allowing them a price for the
gas as an operating expense. Two reasons suggest themselves. In the first place the nat-
ural gas utility is the chief, often the only, market for gas in the field, while electric and
manufactured gas utilities form a much smaller share of the total market for coal and oil.
This means that the gas companies have a much greater hand in determining the "going"
price for natural gas than the other utilities have in determining the market price for coal
and oil. To allow gas companies the field price as an operating expense might let them
lift themselves by their own bootstraps. See hifra note 233. In the second place natural
gas field prices are not as easily ascertained as the prices of coal and oil. The determina-
tion of natural gas "market values" is made none the less in cases involving royalty dis-
putes. E.g., Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Coffee, 140 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. de-
nied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
For whatever reasons rate making bodies first included the producing property of nat-
ural gas utilities in the rate base, it is not hard to see why they have continued to follow
this pattern. A natural gas utility tends to present itself to a commission, much more often
than does a manufactured gas or electric company, as a system completely integrated from
its source of supply to the customer's door. A continuous flow of natural gas from the
field is much more important to a natural gas company than is the flow of coal or oil to
another utility. Thus from the earliest days, at the end of the last century, natural gas
companies have been widely engaged both in production and distribution.
Moreover the commissions, in applying the rate base method to production by natural
gas utilities, heard little or no complaint from the companies until the FPC turned from
a "fair value" rate base to one reflecting only actual cost. See pp. 1478-9 infra. Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson then took up the cudgel against this application of the rate base method. FPC
v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 652-3 (1943) (dissenting).
59. Western Distributing Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 285 U.S. 119 (1932).
60. See SEN. Doc., supra note 29, at 603-9, 614; TROXEL, op. cit. supra note 49, at 95.
61. Missouri v. Kansas Nat Gas. Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924).
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it paid to producers. These purchase prices were simply carried into the
consumers' bills.
62
Moreover, competition did not provide the regulation which the states could
not. Potential rivals were reluctant to invade the holding company empires
which pipelines bound together. 3
GROWTH OF FEDERAL REGULATION
Control of interstate pipelines
To plug the gap in state regulation, Congress in 1938 passed the Natural
Gas Act.0 4 The Act itself was based on a 7-year investigation of interstate gas
and electric companies by the Federal Trade Commission. 5 It gave the Fed-
eral Power Commission the job of regulating the "transportation" and the
"sale in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale for ultimate public con-
sumption." The FPC was excluded from jurisdiction over "local distribution"
and the "production or gathering of natural gas."06
Pursuant to this authority the FPC began to control the interstate pipelines'
wholesale rates to distributing companies. In regulating pipelines that owned
producing property the FPC followed in part the pattern the states had set for
intrastate pipelines. It lumped the pipeline's producing property together with
its transmission property into a single rate base and allowed the pipeline to
charge rates that would yield a fair return on their~total property. 7 But where
the states had fretted over the "fair value" of utility property, the FPC
quickly concerned itself only with the "actual legitimate cost" of the property
to the company. 6  From the "actual legitimate cost" the Commission deducted
62. See note 58 supra.
63. See SEN. Doc., supra note 29, at 228-36, 255-78, 593. By the 'thirties four hold-
ing company groups-Electric Bond & Share, United Corporation, Cities Service, and
Standard Oil (N.J.)-controlled roughly a fifth of the country's gas production, id. at
589-90, and four-fifths of its transmission lines. Id. at 591.
64. 52 STAT. 821 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1946).
65. 52 STAT. 821, §1(a) (1938), 15 U.S.C. §717(a) (1946); SEN. Doe., supra note
29, at 616-17.
66. 52 STAT. 821, § 1(b), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1946).
67. E.g., In Matter of Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 2 F.P.C. 218 (1940), afflirined, 315
U.S. 575 (1942). For the purpose of an interim rate order the FPC in this case accepted
the pipeline's own estimate of reproduction cost as the starting point in arriving at a
rate base. Id. at 227-9.
68. City of Cleveland v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 3 F.P.C. 150, 44 P.U.R. (N.S.) 1
(1942). Hope claimed a rate base of $66 million and sought to justify it by estimates of
"reproduction cost" of $97 million and "trended original cost" of $105 million. Id. at 156-8.
The Commission, however, included in the rate base only an "actual legitimate cost" of
$51 million, less $21 million depreciation, which closely approximated Hope's own book
cost. Id. at 159.
The Supreme Court upheld this procedure and administered the coup de grace to
Smyth v. Ames, notes 54, 55 sipra. FPC v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1943).
Moreover, the Court hinted that the FPC had considerably more leeway in setting rates
than it had taken advantage of in this case. See note 221 infra.
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accrued depreciation and depletion to arrive at a "net investment" or "prudent
investment" rate base. 9
The pipelines attacked both this use of actual legitimate cost and the inclu-
sion of their producing property in the rate base. But the Supreme Court
backed up the FPC.7 ° In effect, therefore, the FPC did gain a measure of
price control over production that was integrated with interstate pipelines.
Dispute over reguiation of independent producers
But what was the FPC supposed to do about the price of gas purchased at
arm's length from independent producers?
In 1940 the Columbian case71 presented this question for the first time. In
this case the FPC decided that it could not regulate independents' prices. But
the decision set the tone for the 10-year controversy that has followed.
Sale by an independent, at the conclusion of production and gathering, seems
to be a "sale in interstate Commerce. ... for resale" within the wording of
the Natural Gas Act. But is it a "sale . ..for resale" within the meaning of
the Act? It is difficult to credit Congress with having conferred this authority
on the FPC at a time when the advisability of regulating the independents'
sales had never been considered. The Federal Trade Commission, in its lengthy
study of interstate natural gas companies, scarcely mentioned the independent
producers, and then only to lament their plight at the hands of the pipelines 2
To help the independents it recommended no federal measures, but the adoption
of state conservation practices.7 3 Congress, in debates and hearings on the bills
that developed into the Natural Gas Act, gave no attention to the regulation of
independents' sales. Its only concern was with the interstate pipelines.74
69. While the FPC did not use the term "net investment" or "prudent investment" in
the Hope case, see note 68 supra, former Commissioner Olds regarded the case as estab-
lishing that principle for rate making. Hearings, supra note 2, at 230-1. After the Hope
case the FPC spelled out the principle in greater detail. In Matter of Miss. R. Fuel Corp.,
4 F.P.C. 340, 344 (1945). See FPC, ANN. REP. 1946, 7-8 (1947); Bonbright, Contribu-
tions of the FPC to the Establishment of the Prudent Investment Principle of Rate Mah-
ing, 14 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 136 (1945); Hale, Utility Regulation in the Light of the
Hope Natural Gas Case, 44 COL. L. REv. 488,495 (1944).
The FPC had previously used the prudent investment principle, however, in its reg-
ulation of electric utilities. See In Matter of Chi. Dist. Elec. Generating Corp., 2 F.P.C.
412, 416-20 (1941).
70. FPC v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 590 (1943) (actual legitimate cost); Colo-
rado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945) (producing property in rate base).
71. In re Columbian Fuel Corp., 2 F.P.C. 200 (1940).
72. SEN. Doc., supra note 29, at 132-3, 184-97, 590-1.
73. Id. at 616, recommending in addition a federal "hot gas" statute to back up state
conservation. Passage by Congress of a "hot gas" act has also been suggested in recent
years. See SMITH-WIMBEnLY RaP. 143-4.
74. See 81 CONG. REc. 6721, 9312 (1937) (debate on H.R. 6585, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.,
the bill that became the Natural Gas Act); Hearings before House Committee on Inter-
state Commerce on H.R. 11662, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, 32 34, 42-3 (1936) (on predeces-
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The legislative history of the Act persuaded a majority of the Commission in
the Columbian case that Congress had intended to regulate only the interstate
pipelines and their sales for resale to local distributing companies. 75 But then
the majority hedged, saying that a change of mind might be called for if the
future showed that the independents were "able to maintain an unreasonable
price despite the appearance of competition. '7 6  One dissenting Commissioner,
however, was ready to regulate these independents' sales then and there."7
Since the Columbian decision the independents have been haunted by the
fear that the Commission might change its mind."8 And subsequent events
sor bill). A spokesman for coal producers saw this elimination of gas production con-
trol as a defect in the bill. Id. at 71-2. See also Hearings, supra note 2, at 485-91 (brief
of Nat'l Ass'n of Railroad and Util. Comm'rs).
Companion bills that would have specifically granted the FPC jurisdiction over the
"procurement" of natural gas for interstate pipelines were not adopted. H.R. 5711, S. 911,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
75. 2 F.P.C. 200, 205-7 (1940).
76. Id. at 208.
77. Former Commissioner Scott, id. at 209. He relied on the wording of the Act
("sale in interstate commerce . . . for resale"), id. at 210, and on the statement in a Con-
gressional report that the purpose of the Natural Gas Act was to close the gap that existed
in state regulation. Id. at 209. The "sale" of gas in interstate commerce was beyond the
jurisdiction of the states, he argued, and therefore the Act conferred FPC jurisdiction
over such sales. Id. at 216-17.
The House and Senate reports on the bill that became the Natural Gas Act contained
this statement: "[I]n the case of sales for resale or so-called wholesale sales, in interstate
commerce (for example, sales by producing companies to distributing companies) the le-
gal situation [is such that the states cannot regulate them]. Such transactions have been
considered to be not local in character and, even in the absence of congressional action,
not subject to State regulation (See Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924) ;
and Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927)).
The basic purpose of the present legislation is to occupy the field in which the Supreme
Court has held that the States may not act." H.R. REP. No. 709, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
1, 2 (1937); S. REP. No. 1162, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937).
On this statement has rested the argument by proponents of FPC regulation of inde-
pendents' prices that Congress intended in the Natural Gas Act to confer such jurisdic-
tion. See, for example, H. REP. No. 1140, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (minority report op-
posing amendment of the Act to exempt independents); Hearings, supra note 2, at 213
(Former Federal Power Commissioner Olds); id. at 499 (Commissioner Buchanan).
The crucial question is what "gap" in state regulation Congress intended to close.
The only indication that this gap included independents' sales to interstate pipelines is the
reference to "producing companies" in the Congressional reports, supra, followed by the
citation of Missouri v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298 (1924), and Pub. Serv. Comm'n v.
Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). But in these cases the Supreme Court
barred state regulation of companies that were not only producers but also interstate
transporters. This situation parallels that of the interstate pipelines, who clearly were
intended to be federally regulated by the Natural Gas Act, rather than that of the inde-
pendent producers of natural gas. For further indication of this intent see note 74 supra.
78. See SMITH-WIMBERLY REP. 155, 166-8; Hearings, supra note 3, at 42, 77, 277-8;
Hearings, supra note 2, at 504.
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have done little to allay this fear. In actual practice the FPC has allowed the
interstate pipelines to recover, as operating costs, the arm's length prices paid
to independent producers." But the Commission's stand has been confusing.
For a time the FPC seemed to maintain simultaneously that it had jurisdiction
over independents' sales and also that it did not. While its General Counsel was
publicly affirming the narrower view, 0 the FPC was asserting the broader
view in the Interstate case."'
In this case the Commission ordered a reduction in the price at which one
interstate pipeline sold gas to another interstate pipeline within the producing
state. The FPC might have asserted jurisdiction over this sale on the ground
that the seller was an interstate pipeline. Instead it chose to justify its regu-
lation by adopting the view that all sales in interstate commerce for resale were
under its wing. 2 Before the Supreme Court the Commission drew back to
rely on the fact that the sale it sought to regulate was made by an interstate
pipeline83 But the Supreme Court in 1947 upheld this regulation in language
that seemed to say that all sales in interstate commerce for resale were within
the reach of the Commission.
8 4
Alarmed at these confusing developments, the independents early in 1947
sought congressional amendment of the Natural Gas Act to explicitly exclude
FPC regulation of their sales to interstate pipelines85 Endorsing this pro-
79. E.g., City of Cleveland v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 3 F.P.C. 150, 183 (1942), affirmed,
FPC v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1943).
80. Shannon, Effect of Recent Supreme Court Decisions on the Produclion and Gats-
ering of Natural Gas, INTERSTATE OIL CoIAcT Q. BULL. 41 (June 1945).
81. In re Interstate Nat. Gas Co., 3 F.P.C. 416 (1943).
82. Id. at 421. The FPC continued to urge this broad interpretation of its jurisdic-
tion before the Fifth Circuit. Brief for Appellee, p. 12, Interstate Nat. Gas Co. v. FPC,
156 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1946), quoted in SM1TH-AVIMBERLY REPORT 169. On the vay up
to the Supreme Court the FPC still stuck by its guns. Brief for Respondent in opposition
to petition for certiorari, p. 12, Interstate Nat. Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682 (1947).
83. Brief for Respondent, pp. 34-5, Interstate Nat. Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 632
(1947).
84. ': .. By the time the sales are consummated, nothing further in the gathering
process remains to be done. We have held that these sales are in interstate commerce.
It cannot be doubted that their regulation is predominately a matter of national, as con-
trasted to local concern. All the gas sold in these transactions is destined for consump-
tion in States other than Louisiana. Unreasonable charges exacted at this stage of the
interstate movement become perpetuated in large part in fixed items of costs which must
be covered by rates charged subsequent purchasers of the gas, including the ultimate con-
sumer. It was to avoid such situations that the Natural Gas Act wvas passed." Inter-
state Nat. Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682, 692-3, rehearing denicd, 332 U.S. 785 (1947).
85. Four identical bills were introduced in the first session of the 80th Congress:
S. 724, H.R. 2185, 2235, and 2292 (1947). The three House bills were later replaced by
the Rizley bill, note 87 infra.
Also seeking relief in these bills were the pipeline-producers, angered at the FPC's
inclusion of producing property in their rate bases at actual cost (less depreciation and
depletion). See note 68 mupra. The pipelines' section of the bills would have prohibited
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posal, the FPC reaffirmed its original view that it did not have jurisdiction over
such sales.86 But from 1947 to 1949 the independents' proposal was stalled in
Congress.87
Meanwhile the position of the FPC began to shift, as its membership changed,
in favor of regulating the independents' prices.88 By 1949 a majority of the
the FPC from compensating pipelines for their own production by including producing
property in the rate base at any valuation. Instead the FPC would have been forced to
allow them as an operating expense the "market price" or the "fair and reasonable value"
of the gas they produced.
A "market price" allowance would have opened the door to price rigging. See
note 233 infra. A "value" allowance would have brought a return to the old "fair value"
rate base. Unless the figure representing the "value" of the gas were pulled out of a hat,
the FPC would first have had to find the "value" of the producing property, calculate operat-
ing expenses, and set an allowance that would cover expenses plus a return on the "value."
The entire FPC opposed these bills on the ground' that action should await comple-
tion of its fuel investigation, note 8 supra. FPC report on S. 734, H.R. 2185, 2292, and
2569, Hearings before House Committee on Interstate Commerce on H.R. 2185, 2235,
2292, 2569, and 2956, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1947). Later Commissioners Smith and
Wimberly proposed an amendment, Hearings before Senate Committee on Interstate
Commerce on H.R. 4051, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 90 (1948), that Commissioner Draper re-
garded simply as another variation of the Rizley bill. Id. at 544.
86. Letters to House Committee on Interstate Commerce from FPC, dated June 27
and July 10, 1947 (11 days and three weeks, respectively, after the Interstate decision was
handed down), quoted in H. REP. No. 1140, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1949).
This approval was soon followed by the Commission's famous Order 139, announcing
that, pending Congressional action, the FPC would not move to regulate sales by inde-
pendents to interstate pipelines. FPC Docket No. R-106, Order No. 139 (Aug. 7, 1947),
printed in Hearings, supra note 2, at 520. Under this order the FPC has exempted a num-
ber of independents. E.g., Delhi Oil Co., OIL & GAS J. 201 (Mar. 17, 1949); Fin-Ncr
Oil & Gas Production Co., 6 F. P. C. 92, 69 P.U.R. (N.S.) 85 (1947).
87. The Rizley bill, carrying both relief for the pipelines and exemption for the inde-
pendents, did pass the house. H.R. 4051, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), 93 CoNa. Rmc.
8751 (1947). But it was killed in Senate Committee. 94 CONG. REc. DAILY DWEST D345
(1948).
The next move was to shear off the pipeline measure and aim solely at exemption
for the producers. This had first been tried in H.R. 4099, introduced as a substitute for
the Rizley bill but never acted on. After the failure of the Rizley bill the producers'
measure was revived in S. 2757, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948). But the Congress ended
without acting on the bill.
At the start of the 81st Congress another try was made. S. 1498, I-I.R. 79, H.R. 1758,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). Later a proposal to exempt producers selling less than two
billion cubic feet of gas annually to interstate pipelines was indorsed by the FPC .Sup-
plenmental Hearings before Subcommittee of House Comnmittee on Interstate Commerce
on H.R. 79, 1758, 982, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). Nothing was done with this proposal,
The Harris bill, H.R. 1758, passed the House late in 1949. 95 CONG. R.c. 10871
(1949).
88. The shift began as follows:
1947: Commissioner Sachse resigned, leaving a four-man Commission. Members
Smith, Olds and Wimberly then sided with the independents, with Draper in opposition.
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Commission 9 hinted that unless Congress forbade them to regulate they might
do so.90 Congress responded by turning down the renomination of Commis-
sioner Olds, chief spokesman for regulation.01 The proposal to exclude the
independents from FPC jurisdiction finally emerged as the Kerr bill.P2 After
it had squeaked through Congress, early in 1950,9 the President vetoed it.r t
Whether the FPC will now assert jurisdiction over independents' sales to
interstate pipelines is uncertain. 9 The answer may come in a proceeding now
pending before the Commission to determine whether the Phillips Petroleum
Company, largest seller of gas to interstate pipelines,90 is a "natural gas com-
pany" under the Natural Gas Act.9 7 The outcome depends a lot on the yet un-
FPC Docket No. R-106, Order No. 139 (Aug. 7, 1949), printed in Hearings, supra note 2,
at 520.
1948: Olds joined Draper in opposing the independents, DRAPER-OLDs REP. 12, and
in hinting at FPC regulation. Id. at 158. Yet at the same time Olds seemed to declare
that he had no desire to regulate the independents Hearings, mipra note 2, at 267 (Olds
reading from his statement made in 1948). See also id. at 93.
89. New Commissioner Buchanan joined the evenly split Commission of 1948, note
88 supra, and sided with Draper and Olds against the independents. Hcarings supra note
3, at 167-74 (FPC report on bills). See also note 90 infra.
90. This majority agreed that they did have jurisdiction over the independents' sales
to interstate pipelines. Hearings, supra note 2, at 248 (Olds), 387 (Draper), 419 (Bu-
chanan). They announced, moreover, that unless Congress acted they would rescind
their Order No. 139, supra note 86, exempting such sales. Supplnental Hearings, supra
note 7, at 321 (Olds), 352 (Buchanan and Draper). This Awas done shortly after the
President's veto of the Kerr bill. See note 95 infra.
91. 95 CoNG. REc. 14386-7 (1949).
92. S. 1498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1950).
93. The Senate substituted the language of the Kerr bill for the House-approved
H.P. 1758 and passed the House bill as amended. 96 CONG. Rnc. 4365 (Mar. 29, 1950).
The House concurred. Id. at 4631-2 (Mfar. 31, 1950). Thus the Kerr bill was the one
adopted by Congress, if not technically, at least in substance.
94. H. R. Doc. No. 555, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
95. In July, 1950, the five-man FPC unanimously rescinded the famous three-year-
old Order No. 139, exempting independents from regulation, note 86 supra. The new
Chairman Wallgren joined Commissioners Buchanan and Draper in stating that their
action stemmed from the President's veto of the Kerr bill; that the FPC did not intend
to start a general investigation of producers' prices; and that after "further studies of the
operation of producers .. ,. the commission plans to promulgate rules and regulations
specifically applicable to them." Commissioners Smith and Wimberly stated that they
acquiesced in the rescission of Order No. 139 only because it "does not accurately reflect
the interpretation placed by the majority on the Natural Gas Act and therefore the
policy of the commission." They said they would elaborate their views in a concurring
opinion to be filed later. FPC Turnabout, OIL & GAS J. 50 (Jul. 20, 1950).
96. Hearings, supra note 2, at 18.
97. See Phillips Hearing, OIL & GAS J. 78 (Feb. 16, 1950); Phillips Hearing Post-
ported, OIL & GAS J. 285 (Oct. 5, 1950) (postponed to Jan. 8, 1951).
An FPC attempt to regulate Phillips' sales need not squarely test the Commission's
jurisdiction over independents, since Phillips' status as an "independent" producer, see pp.
1490-92 infra, is precarious. Phillips transports gas from its Oklahoma wells into Texas
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known view of new Commissioner Wallgren, who holds the balance of power in
an evenly split Commission.
Lurking in the background of the Phillips and subsequent proceedings, and
perhaps vitally affecting their outcome, are the growing importance of the in-
dependents' sales to interstate pipelines and the shadow of rising prices in the
face of an unprecedented demand for natural gas.
THE "FIELD PRICE" PROBLEM
Significance of field prices
Since the start of World War II many parts of the country have been hit by
increasingly acute shortages of natural gas. The pipelines simply have not
been able to pump through enough gas to supply everybody who wants it.08
In the face of this insatiable demand spokesmen for the consumer states,
during the Kerr bill controversy, began to show a new interest in the role of the
independent producer in the natural gas industry.9 The price received by
the independents in their sales to interstate pipelines-loosely called the "field
price"' 0 0-is the only price along the line from well to consumer that has gone
before selling it to interstate pipelines. See Letter to Sen. Gillette from Federal Power
Commissioner Waligren, dated Mar. 22, 1950, 96 CONG. REc. 4060 (Mar. 22, 1950). This
might make Phillips an interstate pipeline.
Phillips recently sold its stock in its subsidiary Independent Natural Gas Co., an
interstate pipeline. Ralph, Test of Power, OIL & GAS J. 133 (Apr. 20, 1950).
98. See FPC, ANN. REP,. 1949, 112-13 (1950) ; Id. 1948, 84-90 (1949) ; Id. 1947, 72-7,
99-100 (1948).
99. See letters and telegrams, for example, in 96 CONG. REc. 3315 (Mar. 14, 1950);
id. at 3846-8 (Mar. 22, 1950) ; id. at 4247 (Mar. 28, 1950).
100. Natural gas is sold in the field under long-term contracts. See p. 1498 in Ira.
The term "field price" is used variously to denote for a given area:
(1) The "going" price that a buyer must offer to get a contract for additional gas.
This price is a matter of rumor in the fields.
(2) The average weighted contract prices at which gas is being delivered to:
(a) interstate pipelines. This is the meaning of "field price" as used in this Com-
ment, and sometimes as used by the Federal Power Commission. The FPC has published
these pric~s, however, only for the southwestern area for 1944 and 1947. SMITrr-WMDElLY
REP. 182; Hearings, supra note 2, at 18, Table 12. In the last two years it has also re-
ported the prices paid by a number of interstate pipelines and those received by a number
of independent producers in that region. Id. at 18-19 (prices in 1947); Smrru-W mB'LY
REP. 182 (various prices 1939-1946).
(b) all buyers in the field, including intra-state pipelines, local industrial ltsers, and
other producers. The nearest thing to a record of these prices are the Bureau of Mines'
figures showing the average of what it calls the "well-mouth" prices of natural gas, by
states, for each year since 1922. See SMITH-WIMBERLY REP. 179, Chart 1. The FPC has
arranged these "well-mouth" prices to obtain regional averages. Ibid.
It is not clear just what the Bureau means by "well-mouth" price. Id. at 180 n.17. It
seems to range below the field price paid by interstate pipelines. In 1944, for example, well-
mouth prices in the southwest averaged 2.9 cents per thousand cubic feet, id. at 179, com-
pared with a field price of 4.36 cents. Id. at 182. In 1947 the well-mouth price was 3.7
cents, Hearings, supra note 2, at 25, Chart 1, the field price, 4.65 cents. Cf. id. at 18, Table
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almost untouched by government control.' 0 ' Moreover, under the present pat-
tern of retail and pipeline rate regulation followed by the states and the FPC,
a rise in the field price is reflected directly in the consumer's gas bill. 02
So far the field price has represented a comparatively small slice of end rates
to domestic and commercial users.'0 3 These consumers have cause for alarm,
however, in the growing importance of the independent producers as sources of
natural gas supplies, and in the recent trend toward rapidly rising field prices.
Growing importance of independents' sales
Before World War II the big interstate pipelines made sure of a large part
of their supply by purchasing or leasing acreage and going into the producing
business.'0 4 They also bought varying amounts of gas from independent pro-
ducers.Y0 5 Today these purchases form a growing share of the pipelines' re-
quirements. In 1947, throughout the southwestern area producing four-fifths
of the nation's gas,106 interstate pipelines bought 62 per cent of their gas from
independents; in 1952 they will buy an estimated 77 per cent.'0 7 And the
12. [This 1947 field price is the average paid by 17 interstate pipelines who purchased 997
billion of the one trillion cubic feet of gas bought by all interstate pipelines in the area. Id.
at 16, Table 8.]
In spite of the difference between field prices and "well-mouth" prices, the FPC has
used the Bureau's figures to indicate the trend of field prices. See Hearings, supra note 2,
at 220-1.
Well-mouth prices vary widely between producing areas, depending chiefly on their
proximity to markets and the extent of their reserves. Prices are highest in the old Appala-
chian fields of the northeast, SMITH-WVIBERLY REP. 179, which now hold only 2.5 per cent
of the nation's reserves. Hearings, supra note 2, at 202. Prices become generally lower as
purchases are made closer to the southwestern area, see SMTH-Vi-BERLY REP. 179-80,
which is more distant from the big markets and has 88 per cent of national reserves. Hcar-
ings, snpra note 2, at 13, Table 1. Field prices follow this pattern. In 1944, for e.-mmple, in-
terstate pipelines paid an average of 21.7 cents per thousand cubic feet for gas in the small
fields of Pennsylvania; 15.3 cents in Kentucky; and 4.3 cents throughout the states of
Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Te.Ms. Surrir-WX=UErLy
REP. 182.
The price of natural gas in the field also may vary widely within the same area, de-
pending on when the long-term contracts setting prices were made. Id. at 181.
101. The only "control" of these prices so far has been a price floor under all gas sales
in the Kansas and Oklahoma areas of the tri-state Hugoton field. See pp. 1501-2 infra.
102. The pipelines' purchase price of natural gas is an operating expense to be recouped
from rates. See pp. 1476, 1481 supra.
103. See note 192 infra.
104. See SEN. Doc., supra note 29, at 72-5, 160-4. The pipelines acquired large blocks
of acreage from the original discovers of the fields at relatively low cost. See SuiTHr-
WIMBERLY REP. 184.
105. See SEN. Doc., supra note 29, at 72-3, 164-9, 472-3, Table 74.
106. In 1945 the states of Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Kansas and New Mexico sup-
plied approximately 873 billion cubic feet, or 79 per cent, of the 1.1 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas transported in interstate commerce. Smrrt-\VIMBERLY REP. 250, Table 4.
107. Hearings, supra note 2, at 16.
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giant pipelines projected into that region since the war are buying virtually
their entire volume from independent producers. 08
Upward trend of field prices
Until the end of World War II, well-mouth prices slid steadily down
hill.Y0 9 They then began creeping upward.1 10 From 1939 through 1946 field
prices paid by interstate pipelines in the southwest remained fairly stable.1 11
In 1947 the big pipelines paid average prices ranging from 3.54 to 7.62 cents
per thousand cubic feet, for an overall average of 4.65 cents.112 But in con-
tracts negotiated in recent years the price has been steadily climbing. A review
of 57 contracts made by interstate pipelines in Texas and Louisiana from 1946-
8 showed an average starting price of 7.5 cents and in some cases 9 or 10
cents."
83
The trend of most recent prices is perhaps illustrated by a look at the ex-
perience of the Phillips Petroleum Company, a big target of advocates of wider
FPC authority in the recent Kerr bill controversy. 114 Phillips is the chief "in-
dependent" 115 supplier of interstate pipelines in the southwest, with the largest
single holdings, amounting to about one-sixth of the acreage, in the country's
two largest fields." 6  In f947 Phillips furnished 11 per cent of the pipeline-
purchased gas in the southwest,"17 or 5 per cent of the total requirements of all
interstate pipelines." 8  Its average price for these sales was 3.9 cents per thou-
sand cubic feet."L9 In 1948 Phillips contracted to supply at 5 cents a specified
volume of gas that was enough to satisfy the then anticipated requirements of
the new Michigan-Wisconsin pipeline.12 0  During the next two years, as the
pipeline sought more gas, the initial contract was modified and the price boosted
108. Id. at 270, 318.
109. The Bureau of Mines' "well-mouth" averages, see note 100 supra, in the southwest
declined from 4.3 cents per thousand cubic feet in 1926 to 2.2 in 1940. SMITI-WIMnRLY
REP. 179. In these days pipelines were often able to contract for gas at 1 or 2 cents. See
SEN. Doc., supra note 29, at 207.
110. From 2.2 cents in 1940 the "well-mouth" price in the northwest rose to 3.7 in 1947.
Hearings, supra note 2, at 361.
111. SMITII-WIM1BERLY REP. 182.
112. Hearings, supra note 2, at 18, Table 12.
113. Hearings, supra note 2, at 223.
114. See, for example, Hearings, supra note 2, at 282, 328; 96 CoN0. REc. 3514 (Mar.
16, 1950).
115. This status is, however, currently in doubt. See note 97 supra.
116. Hearings, supra note 2, at 369, Table 6.
117. Phillips sold 116 billion cubic feet, id. at 18, Table 14, out of a total of I trillion.
Id. at 16, Table 8.
118. Phillips' sales were 116 billion cubic feet, id. at 18, Table 14, out of 2.266 trillion.
Id. at 16, Table 7.
119. Id. at 18, Table 14.
120. Letter to Sen. Douglas from FPC, dated Mar. 17, 1950, 96 CONc. REc. 3697-8
(Mar. 20, 1950).
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to 7.6 cents and then to 8.5 cents. Later in 1949 Michigan-Visconsin signed
tvo new contracts for Phillips' gas, one starting at 10.2 cents and the other at
12.3 cents.'
2 1
Even current contract prices for natural gas are not firm. M\ost of the inde-
pendents' contracts contain "escalator" clauses calling for automatic price
rises of a cent or so every few years. Many of them also bind the pipeline to
match any higher prices it pays to other sellers. And a few require the pipe-
lines to meet any higher price paid by any other buyer in the area.'
FAcToRs BEHIND RISING FIELD PRICES
Mushrooming demand
The sensational recent jump in natural gas consumption stems in part from
the advantages of natural gas as a fuel. Its cleanliness and push-button avail-
ability give natural gas a decided edge over coal and oil for household and com-
mercial cooking, refrigeration and water heating.12 It has an advantage,
somewhat less marked, in space heating.2-4  And it also affords the close
temperature control desired in the production of such goods as high-grade
alloys, glass and ceramics."- To obtain these advantages, consumers have been
willing to pay a premium price over coal and oil. -02 And although natural gas
shares most of its advantages with manufactured gas and electricity, it is far
cheaper than either. 7
121. See FPC data on pipeline purchase contracts, 96 CONG. R.Ec. 3692-3 (Afar. 20,
1950). Mlichigan-Wisconsin maintains that these price increases will not be passed on to
consumers. The increased volume of gas, it claims, will result in lower unit transmission
costs that will actually lower projected wholesale rates. 96 CONG. REc. 3515 (far. 16,
1950) ; id. at 3835 (far. 22, 1950). See p. 1488 infra.
122. See summary of contracts printed in 96 CONG. Rzc. 3646 (Mar. 17, 1950). The
contract provisions requiring pipelines to match higher prices are called "most-favored na-
tion" clauses. Supplemental Hearings, supra note 7, at 300.
123. SuITH-WImBERLY REP. 349, 400-2.
124. Natural gas has an advantage over oil for space heating in that gas requires no
storage facilities on the user's premises. Over coal it has the further advantages of cleanli-
ness and even heat. See id. at 403-6.
125. Id. at 389-90.
126. See p. 1489 infra. Domestic customers use about a third of the natural gas sold
by utilities but foot half the bills. Estimates for 1949: residential users accounted for 900
billion cubic feet of the utilities' 3 trillion cubic feet sold, and paid $582 million of a total
revenue of $1.1 billion. Duff, Natural Gas Turns in Another Record Breahing Pcrorn-
ance, OIL & GAs J., 207, 203 (Jan. 26, 1950).
127. Residential rates for manufactured gas average more than double those for straight
natural gas. See S.iaTH-.ViuBERLY REaP. 339, Table 17. And since manufactured gas has
roughly only half the heating value as the same volume of natural gas, see id., n.1, the
equivalent heat unit price of manufactured gas is nearly four times as great as that of
straight natural gas.
The absence of a national average for electric rates forces comparison with natural gas
rates within particular communities. At the cheapest available rates, residential customers
in Detroit and Dallas, for example, would pay seven times as much for a million B.tu.'s of
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The bulk of natural gas consumption, however, has been simply as a low-
cost industrial fuel competing on a price basis with coal and oil.' " s If pipelines
served only the premium-priced "convenience" users they would have to op-
erate much of the time at well below peak capacity, since this demand fluctuates
with the weather and seasons.120 To fill in the "valleys" of demand, and lower
their unit transmission costs, pipelines have generally carried additional vol-
umes of gas for "interruptible" sale to industries, at low rates, subject to cur-
tailment in favor of domestic and commercial users. 80
In recent years, however, the demand for natural gas has received an enor-
mous impetus from the sharp upward price trend of competing coal and oil.181
electricity as for natural gas. In Detroit the cheapest domestic gas rate for one million
B.t.u.'s is 90 cents. MOODY, PUBLIC UTILITIEs 318 (1940) (rate of 9 cents per 100 cu. ft.
for consumption over 2,000 cu. ft., converted according to standard, note 128 intira). The
comparable electric rate would be $6.59. Id. at 6 (rate of 2.25 cents per kvh for consump-
tion over 250 kwh, converted according to formula in KENT, MECHANICAL EXINEiRS'
HANDBOOx 592, Table 2 (10th ed. 1923)). In Dallas the cheapest domestic gas rate is 61.2
cents for one million B.t.u.'s. MOODY, supra, at 1327 (rate of 61.2 cents per thousand cu.
ft. for consumption over 7,000 cu. ft.). The comparable electric rate is $4.40. Id. at 1526
(rate of 1.5 cents per kwh for consumption over 167 kwh, converted according to formula in
KENT, supra).
128. In 1945, for example, industry used 78 per cent of the country's total marketed pro-
duction of natural gas, SMITH-WIMBERLY REr. 407, and paid an average of 15.8 cents per
thousand cubic feet. Id. at 343, Table 18. The average wholesale price for mine run bitu-
minous coal in that year was $5.33 per ton. SURVEY OF CURENT BusINEss S-33 (U.S.
Dept. Comm. Mar. 1946). The average refiners' price for No. 2 fuel oil was 3.63 cents per
gallon in Oklahoma and the midwest, and 6.21 cents at New York harbor, Smrr-WIM-
BERLY REP. 346, Table 20. (Wholesale prices to large users. Id. at 345.)
These fuel prices may be translated into prices for equivalent heat units--price per
million B.t.u.'s-by the following standard: natural gas, 1,000 B.t.u.'s per cubic foot; bitu-
minous coal, 13,200 B.t.u.'s per pound; furnace oil, 135,000 B.t.u.'s per gallon. Id, at 339,
Table 17 n.1. (Furnace oil includes Nos. 1 and 2 fuel oil. Id. at 347, Table 21). Compara-
tive fuel prices calculated by this standard are at best, however, only rough approximations
which ignore such significant variable factors as differences in utilization efficiency, see id.
at 348-50, regional price differentials, and periodic price fluctuations.
Under this simple conversion standard, the average fuel price per million B.t.u.'s to
industrial users in 1945 was about 15.8 cents for natural gas, 20 cents for soft coal, 26 cents
for fuel oil at Oklahoma and midwest refineries, and 46 cents for fuel oil at New York.
But along with fuel prices the consumer takes into account the dependability of his
service. "Interruptible" service to industrial users of natural gas, see text inilra, calls for
rates lower than those obtainable in simple price competition with coal and oil, See SMTH-
WIMBERLY REP. 293.
129. See id. at 254-5.
130. Id. at 256, 275. This reason for low-priced industrial sales may vanish with the
development of storage facilities near markets. See id. at 276-87. The most practical
method is that of underground storage in depleted fields. Id. at 276-8. In 1946 an esti-
mated 105 billion cubic feet of natural gas was stored in this way. Id. at 282. The capacity
of projects under consideration is estimated at a minimum of 250 billion cubic feet. Id. at
285. For recent developments and a general discussion see Ball, Underground Gas Slorage,
Am. GAs Ass'N, NAT. GAS DEP'T, PROCEEDINGS 35 (1949).
131. See SMITH-WIMBERLY REP. 330-1, 337-45.
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In 1940 natural gas cost domestic consumers an average of roughly 64 cents
per million B.t.u.'s, compared with costs, for equivalent heat units, of 33 cents
for soft coal and 51 cents for oil. By 1947 these figures were in the neighbor-
hood of 59, 55132 and 89 cents,13 respectively. Meanwhile the average pipe-
line industrial rate for natural gas remained stable at about 17 cents per million
B.t.u.'s.'-" But large buyers watched average comparable coal prices rise from
16 to 28 cents, 3 5 oil prices at midwest refineries go from 25 to 52 cents, and
at New York from 35 to 57 cents. 30 This shift also caused manufactured gas
companies, in whose rates the cost of coal or oil is a major factor, to turn to
mixed or straight natural gas.' 37
The extent of the demand for natural gas is indicated by the increase in
national consumption from 2.7 trillion cubic feet in 1940 to 4.4 trillion in
194V7.13 In 1947, interstate transmission totaled 1.3 trillion cubic feet. If the
facilities presently authorized or applied for are built, the volume will reach
roughly 3 trillion cubic feet. 39
In the face of this boom it seems natural enough at first that the field price
of gas should be going up.140 Yet "proved" natural gas reserves have con-
tinued to grow steadily ahead of consumption.' 4 ' In 1931, for example, re-
serves stood at 20 times the then annual rate of withdrawal; in 1947 reserves
represented a 30 years' supply at a much higher production rate.142
This picture of rising field prices in the face of faster-rising reserves pre-
sents an apparent anomaly. One explanation may lie in the fuzziness of in-
formation on reserves. "Proved" reserves are at best only rough estimates that
132. Id. at 339, Table 17.
133. Id. at 339.
134. Hearings, supra note 2, at 362. For conversion standard see note 123 supra.
"Pipeline industrial rate!' is the average price of natural gas sold to industry after
transportation by pipeline. See Surrr-WiUBERLY REP. 407. This rate is slightly higher
than the average total industrial rate, see note 128 supra, because pipeline consumption
excludes that third of total industrial consumption sold for field use and carbon black manu-
facturing, SMITH-NVIMBERLY REP. 360 Table 2, at very low prices. Id. at 364, Table 4
(field use) ; id. at 366, Table 15 (carbon black).
135. The average soft coal price to large industrial users %was $4.19 per ton in 1940 and
$728 per ton in 1947. SMITH-WIMBERLy REP. 344 n.5. For conversion standard see note
128 supra.
136. Id. at 338, Table 16. For conversion standard see note 128 supra.
137. See Natural Gas-Whoosh!, Fortune, Dec. 1949, p. 107, 114 et seq.; Address by
Hudson Reed, President, Am. Gas Ass'n, to Nat. Gas Spring Conference, Au. GAs Ass';,
NAT. GAS DEP'T, PROCEEDINGS 1, 2 (1948); Hearings, supra note 3, at 249.
138. Hearings, supra note 2, at 360, Figure 2.
139. Id. at 203.
140. See SMITH-VIMBERLY REP. 187. Declining field prices up to World War II are
attributed largely to supply outrunning demand. Id. at 183.
141. See chart, Natural Gas Reserves in United States v. Net Production, SMnTH-
WI ERLY REP., facing 45.
142. Id. at 183-4.
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depend on the judgment of individual geologists. 143 This may lead buyers and
sellers, in arriving at their price decisions, to avoid consideration of the specu-
lative supply side of the picture and concentrate on the reality of an insistent
increasing demand. A second explanation may lie in the fact that in large
measure the estimates of recent years represent upward revisions of earlier
guesses on the capacity of known fields rather than primary discoveries of new
fields. 144 An increase in. the estimated gas reserve of a known field might not
have the price-depressing effect of a similar volume of gas discovered in hitherto
virgin territory. A new primary discovery confronts sellers with the horrifying
prospect that vast reserves may be opened up in areas much closer to markets
than theirs.
A third explanation for rising field prices may be that the big independent
producers today are no longer in such a hurry to sell their gas to pipelines.
They are better able than small producers to find other uses for gas in the
absence of a satisfactory price from the pipelines. 14  An increasing volume of
casinghead gas, for example, is being pumped back into oil reservoirs.1,'1
Moreover, some producers have stated that gas is being held off the market for
fear that its sale would bring a greater part of the producer's business within
the FPC's reach if the Commission moves against the independents.
141r
An additional if not alternative explanation for rising field prices in the face
of increased supply may be the existence of monopoly pressures in the produc-
ing end of the industry.
Monopoly elements
Adequate analysis of monopoly factors behind rising field prices must await
the collection of more extensive data. Known conditions, however, suggest
possible monopolistic pressures and point to the need for further study.
Independents' affiliations with pipelines. Thd FPC's list of leading inde-
pendent producers includes such oil and gas names as Phillips, Chicago, Aber-
crombie, Shamrock, Huber, Rogers Lacy, Humble, Skelly, and Sinclair. 1 4 8
The Commission apparently considers as an "independent" producer one who
is not an interstate pipeline himself and who is not, as regards a sale to a particu-
lar interstate pipeline, affiliated with the buyer.1 4 9 Under this definition the
143. Id. at 41-4.
144. See Am. GAS Ass'N & AM. PETROL. INST., REPORTS ON PnOVED REsEnvES o,
CRUDE OIL, NATURAL GAS LIQUIDS, AND NATURAL GAS 20, Table 3 (Dec. 31, 1949).
145. See Duff, Texas Natural Gas, OIL & GAS J. 81, 82 (Oct. 28, 1948); SMIT-WIM-
BERLY REP. 188.
146. See note 25 supra; SMITH-INWIBERLY REP. 88.
147. See, for example, testimony of Hayden Herd, attorney for an independent, Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 107, 110, 112-13; and of R. G. Lawton, vice president of McAlester
Fuel Co., id. at 169-72; Hearings, supra note 3, at 21. Former Commissioner Olds doubted
that gas was being held back for fear of regulation. Id. at 303-9.
148. Hearings, supra note 2, at 17, Table 11, 18-19, Table 14.
149. See, e.g., id. at 207 (explanation of former Commissioner Olds).
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status of a producer and hence his susceptibility to regulation depends in each
case on his relationship with his buyer. The Commission uses the term "in-
dependent", however, as though it denoted a fixed status.150 This makes no
difference when the term is applied to producers like Humble and Sinclair, for
example, who apparently do not sell gas to any affiliated interstate pipelines.'"
But the label "independent" is apt to be misleading when applied to a producer
like Cities Service Oil Co. which sells gas both to non-affiliated interstate pipe-
lines and to its parent Cities Service, also an interstate pipeline.Y2 The oil
company's sales to non-affiliates have so far gone unregulated, and the buyers
are apparently being allowed this contract price as an operating ex-pense. 11
Yet despite the fact that it calls Cities Service Oil Co. an "independent"5 the
FPC, in setting rates for the parent pipeline, includes in its rate base some prop-
erty of the producing company. 1m
Occasionally the FPC has used the Kerr bill's definition of an "independent":
a producer who is neither himself an interstate pipeline nor affiliated with one.1 '
A strict application of this definition would, however, remove from the Com-
150. See, e.g., id. at 17, Table 11 (label "independent producers" used in list); id. at 212
(former Commissioner Olds speaks of regulating "independent producers" as a group).
151. It is almost impossible to determine from public records whether such sales are
made or not. A check of MOODvS, INDUSTRIALS and STANDARD & POOR, CoRP. DE-
scRIPTIONs reveals no such sales. And during hearings on the Kerr bill and similar pro-
posals, neither Humble nor Sinclair was charged with making any.
At any rate the FPC has not tried to assert jurisdiction over the sales of these com-
panies to interstate pipelines. Phillips' status, however, is currently in doubt. See note 97
supra.
152. Cities Service Oil Co. is listed by the FPC as an "independent" producer. Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 17, Table 11. And the FPC distinguishes between the oil company's
sales to "interstate pipelines" in general and its sales to its affiliated interstate pipeline, the
Cities Service Gas Co. Id. at 19, Table 15; id., n.2.
153. A check of FPC reports, MooDY'S, INDUSTRIALs, and STANDARD & Poon, Cone.
DESCRIPTIoNs, does not reveal FPC regulation of such sales made by Cities Service Oil Co.
154. Hearings, supra note 2, at 17, Table 11.
155. In Matter of Cities Service Gas Co., 3 F.P.C. 459, 480-2 (1943).
156. The final version of the Kerr bill passed by Congress did not use the term "inde-
pendent producer" but exempted from FPC jurisdiction "arm's length sales" to interstate
pipelines by "a producer... not otherwise engaged in and not controlled by or controlling
a person otherwise engaged in the transportation or sale of natural gas for resale in inter-
state commerce." The bill then provided that a sale should be deemed to be made at arm's
length if the producer-seller were not affiliated with the buyer. S. 1493, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 2, 3 (1950).
The Senate committee report on the Kerr bill defined the term "independent producer"
as one which sells gas "at arm's length in interstate commerce but which is not otherwise a
'natural-gas company,' [interstate pipeline] nor affiliated with nor controlling or controlled
by such a natural-gas company. The term 'independent' does not appear in the context of
the bill but is used here for descriptive purposes in the interest of clarity and brevity."
SEN. REP. No. 567, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
Former Federal Power Commissioner Olds seemed at times to have this definition of
"independent producer" in mind. See, eg., Hearings, supra note 3, at 202.
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mission's list a number of a number of companies it now calls independents.
Humble, for example, is a subsidiary of Standard Oil (N. J.) which controls
the Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline 57 and whose shareholders also own a net-
work of interstate pipelines in the northeast.158 Similarly the Sinclair Oil &
Gas Co.' ri is related through its parent Sinclair Oil Corp. to the Colorado Inter-
state and Canadian River interstate pipelines. 160
The greater the number of "independent" producers affiliated with pipelines,
the greater the opportunity for them to escape the present FPC regulation of
pipeline-producers. They could sell gas to each other's pipelines, contending
that the sales were made at arm's length and therefore were not subject to price
control. There is no indication that such back-scratching arrangements are
presently being made. But even if they were the FPC would have a hard time
proving it.' 61
Concentration among independents. Advocates of FPC regulation of inde-
pendents' sales to interstate pipelines argue that natural gas production is
concentrated in the hands of relatively few large companies, mostly the major
oil firms. 10 2 These advocates maintain that monopoly power exists and that
it has been used to force pipelines to pay higher prices for natural gas.' 03
Specific evidence to support this charge is lacking. But the assertion of con-
centration among the independents is not entirely without merit. In 1947,
for example, some 600 producers sold gas to interstate pipelines in the south-
157. As of December 31, 1948 Standard held 72.41 per cent voting control in Humble,
and 53.96 per cent voting control in the Interstate Natural Gas Pipe Line Co. 10 STAND-
ARD & PooR, CORP. DESCRIPTIONS 8206 (Jul. 21, 1949). Interstate is under FPC regu-
lation. Interstate Nat. Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682 (1947).
158. Standard stockholders own the Consolidated Natural Gas Co., which in turn con-
trols five operating systems in Ohio, West Virginia, and New York. MOODY'S, PUBLIC
UTILITIES 1422-4 (1949).
159. The Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. is the recent successor in name to the Sinclair-Prairie
Oil Co., 10 STANDARD & POOR, CORP. DESCRIPTIONS 8270 (Jul. 21, 1949), referred to by
the FPC as an independent producer. Hearings, supra note 2, at 17, Table 11.
160. Sinclair Oil Corp. has a 100 per cent interest in Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 10 STAND-
ARD & POOR, CORP. DESCRIPTIONS 8269 (Jul. 21, 1949), and a 51 per cent interest in the
Southwestern Development Co., ibid, which in turn holds a 100 per cent interest in the
Canadian River Gas Co., and a 42.5 per cent interest in Colorado Interstate Gas Co.
MooDY'S, PUBLIC UTILITIES 281 (1949). Both Canadian River and Colorado Interstate
are under FPC regulation. Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945).
161. Suppose, for example that pipeline-producer A contracts to sell a large volume of
gas to pipeline-producer B. Later A contracts to buy another large volume from B. This
need not mean collusion. It could mean that when A contracted to sell it had more than
enough gas to meet its own needs, and that subsequently, facing an unexpected increase in
demand, A does have to buy gas to replace what it previously sold.
162. See, e.g., 96 CONG. REc. 3782-7 (Mar. 21, 1950) (Sen. Douglas) ; Hearngs, supra
note 2, at 382-5 (former Commissioner Olds).
163. See, e.g., ibid.; 96 CONG. REC. 3787, 3788, 3790 (Mar. 21, 1950) ; id. at 3837 (Mar.
22, 1950).
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western area.'3 Thirty-five companies made 72 per cent of these sales,'1
amounting to about 44 per cent of the pipelines' total requirements.6 0 As
compared with the degree of concentration in the coal industry, 67 for example,
these figures tend to indicate the existence of monopoly power.168 But com-
pared with the concentration in the steel industry,16 9 the presence of 35 big gas
producers, and hundreds of small ones, looks like thriving competition.
There is no evidence that concentration among independent gas producers is
likely to increase. The meager evidence available indicates simply that they
will hold their own. Twenty-six of the southwest's big independent sellers to
interstate pipelines in 1947 are expected by this FPC to appear again among
the 35 leaders in 1952.170 These 35 producers will furnish, according to the
FPC, 71 per cent of the pipelines' purchases' 7 ' instead of the 72 per cent sup-
plied in 1947.
Profits of the independents. Another earmark of monopoly power is a
164. Supplemental Hearings, supra note 7, at 365. About 41 interstate pipelines were
then operating in the southwest Hearings, supra note 2, at 206.
The government reported 7,782 companies engaged in oil and gas production in 1939.
U. S. DEP'T CoMM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 776 (1949). In 1946
an independent stated that "there are approximately 20,000 such individuals and companies"
engaged in oil and gas production. Hearings before Special Committee Investigating Pe-
troleum Resources Pursuant to S. Res. 36, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1946).
About 2,300 producers were selling to the country's 114 interstate pipelines in 1947.
Supplemental Hearings, supra note 7, at 365 (producers); FP, STATISTICS OF NAT. GAS
CoMPANIEs v (1947) (pipelines).
165. The FPC lists sales by the 36 largest producers to interstate pipelines in the south-
west in 1947. Their aggregate sales were 733,988,922,000 cubic feet. Hearings, supra note
2, at 18-19, Table 14. To compare the leaders' share of the market in that year with their
share in 1952, for which only 35 producers are listed, see note 171 infra, the 6,089,459,000
cubic feet sold in 1947 by Sunray Oil Co., the thirty-sixth ranking producer, were deducted
from the leaders' totals. This leaves 727,899,463,000 cubic feet sold by the first 35 producers,
or 72 per cent of the 1,012,504,187,000 cubic feet bought by interstate pipelines in the south-
west in 1947. Id. at 16, Table 8.
166. The 35 leading producers supplied 727,899,463,000 cubic feet, see note 165 .supra,
out of a total of 1,639,527,202,000 cubic feet bought and produced in the area by interstate
pipelines. Id. at 16, Table S.
167. For a brief description of competition in the bituminous coal industry see W.cox,
COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 24-26 (TNEC Monograph No.
21,1940).
168. See EDwARDs, MLNTAINING COMPETITION 93 (1949).
169. United States Steel Corp. has maintained over 30 per cent of national steel ingot
capacity and production for 47 years. See Hearhgs before Subcommittee on Study
of Mowpoly Power of House Committee on Judiciary, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 4B, 5, Ex-
hibit S-6 (1950). In 1947 eleven companies had over 90 per cent of national steel production
capacity. Id. at 682, Exhibit S-327.
170. Hearings, supra note 2, at 18-19, Table 15.
171. The 35 leading sellers will supply an estimated 1,671,110,000,000 cubic feet in 1952.
Id. at 19, Table 15. Interstate pipelines accounting for 96.5 per cent of the total interstate
take in the southwest are expected to buy 2,325,548,000,000 cubic feet from independents in
that year. Id. at 16, Table 10.
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continuing record of excessive profits.172  In charging the independents with
monopoly, critics have pointed accusingly at high profits.' 73 Former Federal
Power Commissioner Olds, for example, has presented figures showing the
"income available for corhmon stocks as per cent of common stock and surplus"
of 21 big independents for the years 1946 through 1948. For 1946 these
figures ranged from 5.7 to 19.3 per cent; for 1947, from 11.9 to 28.9 per cent;
and for 1948, from 16.3 to 41.8 per cent. 74 Assuming the accuracy of these
figures,175 their significance is open to question on at least two counts.
In the first place, most independents produce both oil and gas. How much
of their profits were derived from the sale of gas and how much from the sale of
oil, the price of which doubled between the start of 1946 and the end of 1948 ?170
The separation of oil and gas earnings requires an allocation of costs for which
a satisfactory method has not yet been devised.'
77
Second, even assuming that the independents were making excessive profits
on their gas sales, do excessive profits for a two- or three-year period necessarily
indicate monopoly power? The existence of excessive profits over an extended
172. See BOULDING, EcoNoMic ANALYSIS 537 (1941).
173. See, for example, the remarks of Sen. Douglas of Illinois, 96 CONG. REC. 3772-3;
3786-7 (Mar. 21, 1950) ; of Rep. Crosser of Ohio, id. at A2651 (Apr. 4, 1950) ; and of former
Federal Power Commissioner Olds, Hearings, supra note 3, at 220.
174. Id. at 232. Olds referred to these figures during the House hearings, id. at 220,
and also brought them to the attention of the Senate. Hearings, supra note 2, at 366. Rep.
Crosser of Ohio had them incorporated in 96 CONG. REc. A2651 (Apr. 4, 1950).
175. The table listing these figures carried the notation that 1948 earnings were "esti-
mated based on data reported by Moody's Financial Service." See Hearings, supra note 2,
at 366, Table 4. A spot check of some of these figures was made for 1946 and 1947, using
MOODY'S, INDUSTRIALS. The net income for each year was computed as a per cent of the
common stock and surplus at the close of the previous year. The following discrepancies
with Mr. Olds' figures appeared:
Olds' figures Spot check
(1946) (1947) (1946) (1947)
Plymouth Oil Co. 17.6 28.7 18.3 34,8
Republic Nat. Gas Co. 18.6 26.0 21.1 31.7
Shamrock Oil & Gas Co. 18.5 28.9 20.6 33.9
Warren Petroleum Corp. 6.6 27.0 20.0 69.3
176. In January, 1940, the Kansas-Oklahoma well price of oil was $1.11 per barrel.
SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS S-33 (U.S. Dept. Comm. Mar. 1946). In October 1946
this price was $2.51. Id., S-36 (Dec. 1948).
177. Natural gas is usually found in the search for the more valuable oil. At one time a
gas well was regarded as little better than a dry hole, its cost to be charged to oil revenues.
If now the gas is sold, is the revenue pure profit? Similarly, if a well produces both gas
and oil, is the cost of the well to be charged only to oil? It is apparently accepted practice
in the oil industry to deduct gas revenues from the cost of producing oil. See U. S. TARI.F
COMM'N FOR OPA, CRUDE PETROLEUM 43 (1942).
At present, where a pipeline producer extracts natural gasoline and nuisances from its
natural gas, the FPC includes the cost of the extraction plant in the rate base and uses the
revenue from natural gasoline to offset expenses. Cities Service Gas Co. v. FPC, 155 F.2d
694 (10th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 774 (1946). The independents fear the FPC
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period would presumably afford such an indication: otherwise newcomers
would enter the field for a share of those earnings. But where production has
failed to keep up with a spurt in demand, profits for an individual firm or for an
industry as a whole may be temporarily high without indicating a lack of com-
petition.17 8 In each year since the close of World War II most industries have
reported record profits.1 79
Since no close study has been made of gas producers' profits, it is impossi-
ble to say whether they point to monopoly or not.
CHECKS ON FIELD PRICEs
Interfuel competition
As the prices of coal and oil have climbed, the gas producers have grumbled
that the gas they are selling is under-priced. They want the price of gas to
rise to reflect its "intrinsic value" as a fuel; in other words, to bring all the
traffic will bear in competition with coal and oil.180
If this policy were followed, it would seem at first that field prices could rise
until they had pushed end rates so high that unhappy customers switched to
coal and oil. This might be the case with the bulk of industrial consumption,
would do the same thing with their oil business if it regulated their gas sales: treat their
oil activities as an offshoot of gas production. The independents might then be furnishing
gas free of charge. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 119-20, 144, 161, 242-3, 416-17.
The FPC says it would not go this far. It would attribute part of the investment in an
oil-gas well to gas production and leave the company's oil revenues alone. See id. at 241-3,
416-17; Supp. Hearings, supra note 7, at 318. Some of the states have faced this problem.
E.g., Re United Fuel Gas Co., P.U.R. 1918C, 193, 206 (W.Va. 1918). So far the FPC has
not. The FPC has had, however, the similar problem of allocating pipeline transmission
costs as between regulated (interstate utility) and non-regulated (intrastate and direct in-
dustrial sales). In Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC 324 U.S. 581 (1945) the Court ap-
proved an FPC allocation, including a return on investment, that covered both phases of
the problem. The Court pointed out that the Natural Gas Act does not require insistence
on any particular formula. Id. at 589.
Wherever the FPC drew the line, the independents would not want to sell gas to pipe-
lines if they could make more money by e.tracting natural gasoline or making synthetic
fuel.
Many of the new contracts between independents and the pipelines stipulate that the
producer can back out if the FPC tries to regulate him. Supp. Hearings, supra note 7, at
353-9. If the FPC did step in it probably would need an injunction to prevent abandon-
ment of service. Public necessity might compel the granting of such an injunction. And
if the independent were later found to be a "natural gas company" under the Natural Gas
Act, he would have to stick by his original contract to supply gas. See Hcarngs, stipra
note 2, at 220, 224. But suppose the pipeline wants more gas. Would the producer have
to meet this new demand? Why should the producer be compelled to furnish natural gas
to the pipeline at a lower price than he could get by selling his gas for another use?
178. See BOuLDiNG, EcoNomic ANALYSIS 601-2 (1941).
179. See 34 FED. RES. BULL. 842 (1948); SunVMno OF CuRaRuT Buswn;Ess 7-8 (U.S.
Dept. Comm. Dec. 1948) ; Corporate Profits, Another New Record, Business Week, Feb. 5,
1949, p. 74.
180. See pp. 1501-2 infra.
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where natural gas competes chiefly on price terms with coal and oil. At re-
cent price levels, industrial gas sales could bear a whopping increase. 181 But
rates for the "convenience" uses of natural gas-those of domestic, com-
mercial and certain industrial consumers-would meet a check quite apart from
out-and-out competition from coal and oil. This ceiling would be the rates
at which "convenience" users would switch to manufactured gas or electricity.
It is extremely difficult to measure just when such a ceiling might be reached.
Former Federal Power Commissioner Olds has charged that a rise in gas rates
to the level of comparative oil prices in 1947 would have added $506 million to
the $834 million gas bill of utility customers.18 2 It is impossible to answer this
charge because the accuracy of the figures cannot be checked: Mr. Olds did not
announce how he made his calculations. 18
The present price relationship among various fuels concededly encourages
rising field prices for natural gas. But opposed to higher field prices is the ad-
verse interest of the pipelines. Unregulated on their "direct" industrial sales,
184
they want to increase their own profits by beating down the field price at which
they buy gas.'8 5 Conceivably, the pipelines' self-interest in this respect might
be counter-balanced by the fact that they buy large volumes of gas for sale to
utilities."8 8 Since this sale rate is a "cost plus" figure,18 7 the pipelines might
181. In August, 1950 the wholesale price of mine run bituminous coal was $8.70 per ton;
the wholesale price of No. 2 distillate fuel (oil) in New York harbor was 8.2 cents per
gallon. SURVEY OF CuRuRNr BUSINESS S. 35-6 (U. S. Dep't Comm., Oct. 1950). This
coal price is equivalent in heat units to a natural gas rate of about 33 cents; the oil price
to a gas rate of about 60 cents. See SMITIE-WImBERLY REP. 347, Table 21.
182. Hearings, supra note 2, at 364, Table 1. Several times during the hearings Mr.
Olds referred to this table. See, for example, id. at 233, 288.
183. Domestic and commercial rates for natural gas were markedly higher than com-
parative oil prices in 1947; direct industrial gas rates were far lower. If Mr. Olds simply
recast industrial gas rates in terms of oil prices, his statement is misleading because it ig-
nores the big share of the market where gas does not compete on purely price terms with
oil. Moreover, it is not clear why Mr. Olds chose to use only comparative oil prices. A
calculation in terms of the corresponding coal price in 1947 would lower the possible natural
gas rise; an estimation in terms of comparative manufactured gas rates would push the
natural gas rise higher. See note 127 supra.
184. The Federal Power Commission is barred from regulating the interstate pipelines'
rates for direct industrial sales by the Natural Gas Act, which gives the Commission Juris-
diction only over "sales ...for resale.' 52 STAT. 821, § 1(b) (1938), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 717(b) (1946).
So far the states have not attempted to fix these direct industrial sales prices. But
state jurisdiction over such sales was upheld in Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. Pub.
Service Comm'n of Ind., 332 U.S. 507 (1947). On this precedent the Supreme Court of
Michigan recently upheld its Commission's decision that Panhandle must obtain a certificate
of convenience and necessity for its direct industrial sales. N. Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1950, p.
22, col. 2.
185. Cf. SMITH-WIMBERLY REP. 216 n.39.
186. See note 17 supra.
187. "Cost plus" in the sense that under present FPC regulation the pipelines charge
their gas purchases as operating expenses to be recouped in sales rates. See note 79 supra.
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not care how much they paid for their gas. There are three reasons, however,
why this is not so.' s8 In the first place, the pipelines have no desire to see field
prices rise to a point where they start to reduce the "convenience" demand for
natural gas.' 8 9 Second, although the pipelines under present regulation can
expect to recover in full whatever price they pay in the field to independents,
this recovery is not automatic. It takes a rate proceeding that may drag on for
several years. 90 And finally, the producers sell their gas to the pipelines at a
flat price per thousand cubic feet, with no discrimination according to the ulti-
mate use of the gas.191 Thus although the "convenience" uses might support
a higher field price than industrial consumption, 92 a rise in field prices that
pushed "convenience" rates too high might price the producers right out of the
industrial market. The lower of the end rate limits-whether "convenience"
or industrial' 9 3-- would therefore tend to become the ceiling for both.
Competition anwng producers
The essence of competition among sellers is the availability to buyers of
alternatives in the market. In the natural gas industry this choice may lie
between different fields and between producers in the same field. Advocates of
FPC regulation of independents' prices contend that the pipelines' freedom of
choice is virtually as restricted as that of the household consumer, because both
are physically tied to their suppliers.191 This analogy is not very accurate. The
Presumably the FPC has the power to prevent "improvident" payments for raw materials.
BARN~s, op. cit. supra note 52, at 606. But the question is what payment is "improvident"
when field prices are not regulated and there is no recognized "market price."
188. Whatever their reasons, the pipelines' opposition to increased field prices is evi-
denced by their fight against the minimum price fixing actions of Kansas and Oklahoma.
See note 217 infra.
189. In the present period of insatiable demand for natural gas this point would not be
reached quickly. See pp. 1484, 1487-9 suPra.
190. For example, the proceedings in the Colorado Interstate case were begun March
14, 1939. After extensive hearings the FPC rendered a decision March 18, 1942. In
Matter of Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 3 F.P.C. 32, 35 (1942). The Supreme Court affirmed
the FPC decision April 2, 1945. Clo. Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945).
191. Conceivably the independents might try to sell their gas as do the pipelines and
distributing companies, at prices that vary according to the class of user. But for the
utilities this price differential is not discrimination; it is justified by the different costs of
supplying, for example, a large volume of gas to a single buyer and the same volume to
thousands of buyers.
192. The field price of natural gas in the southwest in 1947 represented about 8 per cent
of the average domestic-commercial rate and 27 per cent of the average industrial rate.
[Field price 4.65 cents, Hearings, supra note 2, at 18; domestic-commercial rate 59 cents;
and industrial rate 17 cents. See p. 1489 supra].
193. But low-priced industrial sales may give way gradually to higher-priced sales with
the development of storage facilities near markets. See note 130 supra.
194. See, for example, the remarks of Sen. Douglas of Illinois, 96 Co:,G. Rnc. 3658,
3685 (Mar. 20, 1950), id. at 3769 (Mar. 21, 1950) ; of Sen. Meyers of Pennsylvania, id. at
3534 (Mar. 16, 1950) ; of Rep. Sullivan of Nebraska, id. at A2796-7 (Apr. 4, 1950).
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small consumer has no practical choice between distributing companies because
he is not prepared to build his own line to connect with them. Interstate pipe-
lines, however, are prepared within limits to do just this to reach suppliers.
Interfield competition. Initially, a pipe line can plan to reach gas sup-
plies in fields scattered across a half dozen states.""5 Before the pipe-
line is built its promoters can seek acreage or contracts and then map their
route on the outcome of this dickering.196 Two of the big postwar pipelines,
for example, start deep in Texas and come north along the Gulf coast through
Louisiana, passing more than a dozen fields.10 7 The older pipelines in the
southwest, most of which hold gas acreage themselves, usually tap two or
more fields in the gas belt stretching from southwestern Kansas to Louisiana.' 8
Nevertheless, once a pipeline has been laid, competition among suppliers is
narrowed to the fields along its route. Since a pipeline cannot be shifted
around like a hose, producers in the hooked-up fields probably could boost
prices substantially before the pipeline threatened to extend to other fields.
And producers in these other fields, already connected to pipelines, need strong
incentives to launch feeder lines so that they can compete with producers some
distance away.
Intraield competition. Within the gas fields, sales competition among pro-
ducers is fostered by the fact that pipelines are always ready to hook up with new
suppliers. Nevertheless price competition among producers is sluggish because
field prices do not respond rapidly to changes in supply and demand. Unlike
wheat or even oil, for example, natural gas is not sold from day to day at "spot"
prices, but on the basis of long term contracts that fix prices far in advance. 100
The liveliness of the bargaining on these contracts depends in part on the
effect of state regulation of production. In theory at least, prorationing re-
stricts competition among producers by limiting the amount each can take from
his wells. 20 Since each producer knows that his neighbors are thus held back,
his hand is strengthened in dealing with the pipelines. This tends to bolster
prices. 20' In practice, however, state prorationing may not restrict competition
195. See map, Major Producing Areas in the United States, SMITH-WIMBERLY RVP,.,
facing 40.
196. See, e.g., an account of the dickering by Texas Illinois Natural Gas Pipeline Co. 10
STANDARD & POOR, CORP. DESCRIPTIONS 7949 (Aug.-Sept. 1949).
197. See routes of Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. and Trans-Continental Gas Pipe
Line Corp., Hearings, supra note 2, map facing 360. Trans-Continental will start delivery
this year. MOODY, PUBLIC UTILITIES 1580 (1949).
198. Panhandle Eastern, Northern Natural, Colorado Interstate, and Cities Service, for
example, all tap the Hugoton and Panhandle fields. United Gas Pipe Line draws gas from
many smaller scattered fields. See SMITH-WIMBERLY REP., map facing 242.
199. See id. at 213, 219. Many contracts have "escalator" clauses calling for price in-
creases every few years, see p. 1487 .rpra, but these increases are set in advance at the
time the contract is signed.
200. See p. 1473 supra.
201. The price-bolstering effect of prorationing has been discussed chiefly in connection
with oil. "Various excuses for restricting output are given but certainly the fundamental
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so severely. Production quotas are not frozen: producers can expand their
quotas by opening up new acreage.202
Moreover, the states provide a positive spur to competition among producers
in laws forbidding the blowing of casinghead gas into the air. These laws force
producers either to dump their gas on the market immediately, at any price they
can get, or to pump it back into the ground where it becomes a reserve that
hangs over the market in the future.2- s
Yet competition among producers in a field clashes head on with the growing
desire to extract oil and gas efficiently. Gradually competition has given
ground to cooperation. The best example of this is when oil and gas fields are
operated as units in the manner that engineers agree gives optimum recovery. 20
Restrictions on entry into production. An important check on rising prices
is not only competition among concerns presently engaged in production, but
also the possibility of entry into the field by new firms.2 5 No data are avail-
able that would indicate the ease or difficulty of entry into the gas production
business. Most of the present leading independent producers have long been
big companies. 20 0  On the other hand some of today's big independents, like
purpose is to eliminate competition that prices may be raised." KRE!NITZErl, REBIRTa OF
MONOPOLY 97 (1938). See %VATxINS, OIL: STABILIZATION OR CONSERVATION? 120-33
(1937). This writer concludes that conservation is incidental to price stabilization. Id. at
255.
202. Since a producer's individual quota depends largely on the acreage and number of
wells he has, see note 41 and text stpra, he can expand his quota to a larger share of the pool
quota by adding acreage and wells.
203. See p. 1490 supra; SmITH-WmBERLY REP. 188.
204. For a discussion of unitization see p. 1474 supra. The idea behind unit op-
eration of a pool is to have surface owners ignore, for operating purposes, their zigzagging
surface boundaries and produce oil or gas as could an individual who owned the entire pool.
Production can then be tuned perfectly to buyers' demands. This necessarily eliminates
competition in production among participants in the unit. In theory it need not eliminate
price competition among them. Each participant could receive his share of production and
sell it on his own. But the essence of price competition among sellers is the buyers' freedom
to choose among them. A buyer has little choice in filling his demand when he is faced by
individual sellers whose offered volumes are so fixed that in the aggregate they equal his
demand. The buyer must take the individual shares offered or go vithout. He cannot
reject one seller and take a larger volume from another. In practice, then, there vould be
little incentive for sellers to engage in price competition.
From the standpoint of competition not only the production of the oil or gas but also its
marketing might just as well be carried on by the unit operator. Because it is simpler to
split up the sales proceeds among the unit participants than to hand them shares of the
product, this unit marketing procedure is usually followed. See, for example, McCaslin,
Nation"s Largest Unit Operation Accomplishes Mitch in First Three Months, OIL & GAS J.
44, 63 (Jan. 1, 1948).
205. See EDWARDs, MAINTAINING COMPETITION c. 6 (1949).
206. For a list of the leaders, see Hearings, supra note 2, at 18, Table 14.
In 1947 Phillips Petroleum Co., for example, was the leading seller of gas to interstate
pipelines in the southwest, with sdles of 116 billion cubic feet, ibid, out of total independents'
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Chicago and Republic, are comparative newcomers to the top ranks.207
Nevertheless, increasing costs of exploration20 8 may be limiting entry into a
field that has traditionally been wide open for the individual or small firm with
nerve and Money to gamble. When the lone wolf strikes oil or gas, he
often sells his property to an established company which then carries on the
production and marketing.20 9
Smnmary. Various kinds of competition impose some limits on field prices,
but these limits are probably not low enough to prevent a considerable price in-
crease.
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF FIELD PRIcEs
The economic justification for government interference with field prices for
natural gas is that competition is falling down on the job. The simple fact of
rising prices is not enough, per se, to support the conclusion that competition
has failed. If competition has failed, however, rising prices may mean that
producers are making excessive profits at the expense of consumers. To prevent
such exploitation the federal or state governments might appropriately inter-
vene in the natural gas industry.
The government might act in one of three ways. First, the federal government
might take over the industry and produce and market gas itself. Second, it
might take steps, through antitrust suits or administrative regulation, to restore
competition among producers. 210 Neither nationalization nor the restoration of
competition is being seriously considered today. But the third step-direct
price control by the federal or by state governments-is a real possibility.
sales of one trillion cubic feet. Id. at 16, Table 8. Phillips' assets in that year were about
$439 million. PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1949). At the same
time Humble Oil & Refining Co. made the fourth largest volume of sales to interstate pipe-
lines in the southwest.
In 1933 Phillips had total sales of 189 billion cubic feet (sales to interstate pipelines
not reported), and assets of $179 million. MOODY, INDUSTRIALS 2363 (1934). Humble
had assets of $249 million (no report of its gas sales). Id. at 2950.
207. In 1947 the Chicago Corp. and the Republic Natural Gas Co., for example, madd
the second and third largest volumes of sales, respectively, to interstate pipelines in the
southwest. Hearings, supra note 2, at 18, Table 14.
In 1933 Chicago was not in the gas business. Starting as an investment trust in 1929,
it had assets of $24 million in 1933, MOODY, BANKS 643 (1934), and entered the oil and gas
business in 1941 with the acquisition of reserves in Texas. MOODY, BANKS 1313 (1948).
Republic started in the oil and gas business under another name in 1928, and in 1933 was
adjudicated bankrupt. MOODY, INDUSTRIALS 2868 (1934).
208. See SMITH-WIMBERLY REP. 188.
209. See Hearings before Sen. Spec. Committee Investigating Petroleum Resources
Pursuant to S. Res. 36, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946).
210. See pp. 1497-1500 supra.
The establishment of effective inter-pool competition would require first, the develop-
ment of an extensive system of lines making it possible for each pipeline to draw gas from
more fields, and second, probably the abandonment of long-term contracts in favor of "spot"
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State regulation
So far the producing states, far from worrying about producers' high prices
and profits, have been interested only in putting a floor under field prices for
natural gas. Producers in recent years have complained loudly that prices are
too low21' that increases are needed both to compensate them for the "in-
trinsic value" of natural gas212 and to encourage conservation and explora-
tion. 213 Legislators in Texas and Louisiana 14 have listened and responded by
pricing that would permit the flow of gas from different fields to vary in response to fluc-
tuations in supply and demand.
The transportation phase of inter-pool competition might be met in either of two ways.
On the one hand the existing pipelines could extend branches into each of the various fields.
This would require, however, an enormous investment in additional duplicating lines which
the consumer would pay for in higher rates. On the other hand the fields could be con-
nected by common carrier pipelines. A glance at a pipeline map gives the impression that
this could easily be achieved. The various fields are now fairly well tied together physically
by a network of pipes. See map in Hearings, supra note 2, facing 360. These interlacing
pipes are not now common carriers, but separate integrated gas systems serving their own
customers in the southwest. The problems that would arise in making common carriers of
gas pipelines are formidable. See Connor and Biddison, Con mon Carrier Obligations as
Applied to Natural Gas Transmission Lines, Au. GAS ASS'N, NAT. GAS DnE'T, PROcEED-
INGs 66 (1935).
The achievement of "spot" pricing in the gas fields would put pipelines to bidding
against each other for their immediate needs on a day-to-day or month-to-month basis.
Field prices and perhaps end rates, indirectly, would fluctuate accordingly. See discussion
of fuel adjustment clauses, note 56 supra. Consumers would then regard themselves as the
beneficiaries (if rates went down) or victims (if rates went up) of a flexible price system
that would do the job cut out for competition: the allocation of resources, in terms of supply
and demand, to those whose want and buying power is greatest. This price allocation is
imperfect today because field prices are either frozen under long-term contracts or, if sub-
ject to "most-favored nation clauses", see note 122 supra, can go up but cannot come down.
"Spot" pricing in the gas fields might, however, have an undesirable effect on service
to consumers. It works well enough in the oil market, perhaps because oil can be stored
in tanks in the field and at the refinery end of the pipelines, and thus can flow in more or
less irregular shipments. If a gas pipeline did not know from one day to the next where its
supply was coming from, its service might become an interruptible one, with its attendant
inconvenience and hazards as well. See note 225 infra.
Long-term contracts on the other hand assure a steady supply of gas. This is why the
FPC requires such contracts before it authorizes construction of pipelines. See Hearings,
supra note 2, at 161, 179, 183. But a steady supply of gas at the intake end of the pipeline
might be unnecessary if enough storage facilities were available at the consuming end. See
note 130 supra.
211. See, for exmple, Starmont, Minimum Gas Prices, OIL & GAS J. 38 (Jan. 12,
1950); SmiTH-W BERLY REP. 190; Hearings before House Commiette on Interstate
Commerce on H. R. 2185,2235,2292,2569, and 2956, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 353 (1947).
212. By "intrinsic value!' the gas producers mean a price per heat unit equivalent to that
of coal or oil. See DRAPER-OLDs REP. 139.
213. See SiTu-WVixsmB.LY REP. 190-1; DRAPER-OLDs REP. 118.
214. Air. BAR Ass'N SEc. OF M N. LAw, CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS-A LEcAL
HISTORY 456 n.19 (1948) (Teas, 1947) ; id. at 236-7 (Louisiana, 1946, 1948).
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introducing bills authorizing the fixing of minimum prices in the field. The
regulatory commissions of Oklahoma and Kansas, also hearing these com-
plaints, have fixed minimum prices even without explicit statutory authority."1"
And these orders have been upheld by the respective state supreme courts.210
It takes little imagination to see that regulation by the producing states offers
slim hopes for containing field prices. If the producers are strong enough to
convince their legislators, commissions, and courts to shore up prices that are
already climbing rapidly, they could easily block attempts to impose state price
ceilings. Apparently the voice of local consumers counts for little in the pro-
ducing states. And certainly the voice of millions of consumers in other states
counts for nought.
Moreover, state price regulation may not be legal. The Kansas and Okla-
homa price fixing orders may be an unconstitutional burden on interstate com-
merce when applied to sales to interstate pipelines. 217 And the Supreme Court
may find that the federal government, through the Natural Gas Act, has pre-
empted the field.2 18
Federal regulation
Only the federal government could reasonably be expected to clamp down
on natural gas field prices to prevent producers from reaping excessive profits
at the expense of consumers. But such action should not be taken until several
basic questions are answered with respect to price fixing methods and the effect
of price control on the conservation of natural gas.
Price fixing methods. If the chief aim of federal regulation of independents'
prices is to prevent excessive profits, the initial problem is the twofold one of
measuring profits and then determining when they are excessive. So far this
dual problem has been given scant consideration. 21 Moreover, once the
215. Peerless Oil & Gas Co. v. Cities Service Gas Co., Okla. Corp. Comm'n Order No.
19514 (Dec. 9, 1946) ; In re Hugoton Gas Field, 77 P.U.R. (N.S.) 150 (Kan. 1949). The
Oklahoma Commission set a minimum price of 7 cents per thousand cubic feet on natural
gas sales in its part of the great Hugoton field that stretches across the Oklahoma pan-
handle into Kansas and Texas. Kansas went Oklahoma one better by setting a minimum
price of 8 cents per thousand cubic feet in its part of the Hugoton field. A few months
before the Kansas order was issued, three interstate pipelines were buying gas in the Kansas
Hugoton field at average prices of 4Ws, 4.6 and 5.5 cents per thousand cubic feet. Brief
for Appellants 16, 21, 20, Kansas-Nebraska Nat. Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 222 P.2d
704 (Kan. 1950).
216. Cities Service v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 220 P.2d 279 (Oki. 1950); Kansas-Ne-
braska Nat. Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 222 P.2d 704 (Kan. 1950).
217. The pipelines argued this point in the State courts. Cities Service v. Peerless Oil
& Gas Co., supra note 218, at 291; Brief for Appellants 96-103, Kansas-Nebraska Nat. Gas
Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 222 P.2d 704 (Kan. 1950). But the supreme courts of Okla-
homa and Kansas rejected this attack with scant discussion.
218. See Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 331 U.S. 682 (1947), rehearing delied,
332 U.S. 785 (1947). And see discussion p. 1481 stupra.
219. See pp. 1493-5 supra.
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measurement problem has been solved there are two radically different ap-
proaches to the separate problem of fixing prices. One approach aims at the
result theoretically achieved by competition: the elimination of above normal
profits by the producing industry as a whole. The other approach is that of
public utility regulation: control of the profits of individual firms.
Under the industry-wide approach, the federal government presumably
would undertake to set uniform maximum prices at which independents could
sell to interstate pipelines. These uniform prices might vary among broad
regions. But they would be set only as high as necessary to bring forth the
desired volume of gas.32 °
How would such uniform prices be arrived at? The only feasible method is to
rely on past experience in the industry.2- That experience, as shown by the
government's chief price-fixing experiments to date, is largely the story of
cost.2" In a new experiment with regulating field prices, the government
might, for example, set maximum prices by tacking a mark-up on the average
220. See Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in FPC v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591,
652-3 (1943). The present Natural Gas Act requires only that rates for a natural gas
company be "just and reasonable." 52 Stat. 822 (1938) as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717c (1946).
While the FPC has in practice set pipeline rates on an individual company basis, the Act
would not seem to prohibit the Commission, if it undertook to regulate field prices, from
establishing uniform prices. See id. at 652.
221. Conceivably a rate fixing body might throw past experience to the vinds, pull rates
out of a hat, and simply wait to see how they affect the industry tomorrow. The Hope
case, 320 U.S. 591 (1943), might be read to allow this trial and error "method" at least as
applied to prices for individual firms. The gist of the Hope majority opinion wvas that
FPC rates for a particular company would be reasonable if under such rates the company
remained healthy. Id. at 602-3.
Yet it is hard to imagine that any commission would adopt a technique of price fixing
that could be validated only by hindsight. Since producers would complain loudly at any
price cut, the commission would have a hard time deciding just how low a price would in
fact be ruinous. Too low a guess might drive firms out of business and disrupt production
before the commission discovered its error.
Moreover the constitutionality of such a rate method would be wide open to attack on
the ground that rates so fixed were arbitrary and confiscatory. This objection might even
prevail against uniform rates, based on experience in the industry, which would deprive
some producers of a fair return. See note 224 and te-t in fra.
222. During the depression of the 'thirties the federal government undertook to fix mn-
imum prices for milk and bituminous coal. There were no definite standards for setting
milk prices, but past prices and costs played an important role. Factors considered were
historical prices, prices for manufacturing purposes, transportation and sanitation costs,
market prices, and the notion of a "fair" price. See WALLACE, Ecor.omc STANDARDS OF
GOVERNMENT PRICE CONTROL 85-7 (TNEC Monograph No. 32, 1941). Minimum coal
prices were supposed to be set equal to the average weighted cost per ton in the price area.
See id. at 274 et seq.
World War I maximum coal prices were set on a cost-plus basis. See id. at 247.
And during World War II, OPA ceiling prices for bituminous coal, oil, and textiles were
based largely on costs. HARRIS, PIcE AND RELATED CONnoLS IN nH UNITm SrrTs 51
(1945).
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cost of production in an area. The chief difficulty in working with costs on an
industry-wide basis, however, is that it takes a tremendous amount of time to
assemble the necessary data. When minimum prices were attempted in the
coal industry, it took three years to get the cost facts.
2 2 3
Under uniform price fixing on an industry-wide basis, low-cost producers
would prosper and high-cost producers presumably would be driven out.-
2
For producers to drift in and out of the market at will might curtail the con-
tinuous flow of gas that is the essence of service to consumers.6 On the other
hand, forcing individual producers to continue service when they were losing
223. See WALLAcE, op. cit. supra note 222, at 313.
224. This seems to be the suggestion of Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in FPC v. Hope
Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 652 (1943).
The constitutional objection to maximum prices under which some individual producers
may not make a profit is that such action deprives them of their property without due proc-
ess of law. This objection has been dismissed where the price fixing complained of was
carried oil under the war power. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 518 (1944).
But the due process objection has not yet been squarely dealt with where maximum
prices have been fixed on the basis of governmental authority outside the war power. The
most recent federal case dealing with this problem is Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins.
Co., 169 F.2d 281 (App. D.C. 1948). There several fire insurance companies objected that
the uniform maximum rates fixed by the District of Columbia were confiscatory because
they denied certain companies a fair profit. The Court of Appeals sent the case back to the
trial court for more specific findings on this point. Without deciding the constitutional
issue, the Court reviewed at length the cases relied on to sustain maximum prices which
would deprive some firms of a profit.
The authority for the constitutionality of such price fixing is necessarily meager, be-
cause the precise issue has not yet arisen. But dicta and analogy argue persuasively in fa-
vor of constitutionality.
Under minimum price fixing a firm may be caught between the competitively deter-
mined price at which it sells and the fixed cost (minimum price) at which it buys. An
objection by a business in this plight was rejected in Hegeman Farms Corporation v.
Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163, 170 (1934). Mr. Justice Brandeis distinguished minimum from
maximum prices, id. at 171, in a manner that seems to imply that firms thus squeezed by
maximum prices could complain. But there is no sound reason for finding constitutional
significance in the fact that a maximum price order affects one person's selling price while
another affects his costs. In either case lie may suffer loss. See Freund, The Emlergency
Price Control Act of 1942: Constitutional Issues, 9 LAw & CONTEMP. Piton. 77, 83-4
(1942).
See Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 518 (1944) (rent control); Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Hyde, 275 U.S. 440, 447 (1928) (insurance rates); Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U.S. 391,
401, 410 (1894) (grain elevator rates); Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 29 F.2d
750, 755 (D.Neb. 1928), aff'd 280 U.S. 420 (1930) (stockyard brokers' rates). See also
Freund, supra, at 83-4; Note, 34 CoL. L. IRv. 1336, 1339-40 (1934).
But see Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, supra, at 446; Matthew Addy Co. v. United States,
264 U.S. 239 (1924) (World War I coal prices).
225. It is usual pipeline practice to meet peak demands, see p. 1488 supra, by packing the
line under full pressure so that for short periods gas may be withdrawn from the line faster
than it goes in. See SMITH-WIMBRLY REi. 274. The "accordion" effect of this line
storage allows a flexibility of input. See Potter, The Effect of Pipe Line Storage and Op-
eration of Sources of Supply on Transmission Line Capacities During High Demand Peri-
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money at the ceiling price would certainly be unfair and very probably would
be unconstitutional22 as well. -
In contrast to the industry-wide approach to price control is the method of
public utility regulation, which concerns itself with the profits of individual
firms. The FPC usesthis approach in regulating pipelines, allowing them as
profits a return on the net investment-actual legitimate cost less depreciation
and depletion-in their property.2 s Congressmen, independents and the FPC
have assumed, without discussing alternatives, that this same method would be
applied to the independents' prices if the FPC undertakes to control them.--'
In its pipeline regulation the FPC has concentrated chiefly on whether the
company's books show expenditures actually made. The independents would
oppose this emphasis on actual investment with understandable vehemence. It
would probably catch many of them as it did the pipelines: currently receiving
prices much higher than a "fair return" on the cost of property acquired years
before.2 0
The industry argues that this net investment procedure achieves unjust re-
sults.231 Producer A, who spends $10,000 and hits gas on his first drilling, re-
ods, Am. GAs Ass'N, NAT. GAS DE'T, PocEEDncs 74, 82 (1938). Nevertheless input
does follow, whether smoothly or unevenly, variations in demand. Id. at 80-1, Figs.
5,6.
If producers could supply gas or not as they chose the correspondence between input
and output would be purely fortuitous, leaving consumers to face a potential collapse in
service at the time they need it most. Moreover, a cutoff of input that dropped gas pres-
sure suddenly would not only deprive distant householders of hot water and warmth. It
might snuff out a burner tip flame, with the danger that when pressure was restored the
gas would flow into the house through an open valve.
These hazards might be avoided by having large storage facilities near markets, from
which gas could be drawn in event of temporary interruptions at the field end of the pipe-
lines. See note 130 supra.
226. See note 224 supra.
227. Somewhere in limbo between the industry-wide ma-xmum and the indiidual-firm
approaches to price control is the price freeze. Its use is justified chiefly in time of emer-
gency, for lack of time to prepare a better scheme, or as the initial step in a longer-range
program. See H-ARms, op. cit. supra note 222, at 56; Dickerson, The "Freece" Mcthod of
Establishing Ceiling Prices, in FRANcm AND QUINT (ED.), PROBLEMS IN PRICE CONTROL:
PRcING TEcHniguEs 31-72 (Historical Rep's on War Administration: Office of OPA,
Gen. Pub. No. 8, 1947).
As a permanent price fixing technique the "freeze" would do just that to inequities
already existing among producers and consumers, eliminating neither the excessive profits
of the industry as a whole nor those of a particular firm.
228. See pp. 1478-9 supra.
229. See, e.g., Hearings, smPra note 2, at 95 (Sen. Kerr); id. at 505-6 (Independent Pe-
troleum Ass'n of America) ; id. at 10 (FPC report on Kerr bill).
230. See Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 610-11 (1945) (47,000 acres in-
cluded in rate base at $4,244.24) ; Cities Service Gas Co. v. FPC, 155 F.2d 694, 706-7 (10th
Cir. 1946) (68,000 acres included in rate base at zero), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 773 (1946).
231. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 152; Surrn-W V n LY REP. 210, 217-18. The
industry has been joined in this view by Mr. Justice Jackson. FPC v. Hope Nat. Gas Co.
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ceives a 6 per cent return on his rate base of $10,000. But Producer B, who
drills several dry holes and spends $50,000 before striking gas, perhaps in the
same pool, receives a 6 per cent return on his $50,000. This rewards indi-
viduals for their efforts instead of their achievements. The pipeline-producers
who have had experience with the cost rate base tried to remedy this economic
injustice first by returning to the discredited "fair value" rate base.2 2 Failing
in this, they sought to compel the FPC to exclude their producing property from
the rate base and allow them the "average field price" for their gas as an op-
erating expense.233 This proposal was also unacceptable to Congress.
But the Supreme Court has opened the door to avoidance of the FPC's cost
rate base by allowing interstate pipelines to sell their producing property. The
FPC included in the rate base of Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line at its actual cost
of $955,000 gas acreage which the company claimed was worth $8,400,000. "'1
Panhandle then set up the Hugoton Production Co. with a capitalization of
$10,000,000 and turned over to it $675,000 and 97,000 acres recently included
in Panhandle's rate base at $160,000. In return Panhandle took an option to
buy gas from this acreage after 1964, and all of Hugoton's stock. The stock
was then distributed to Panhandle's shareholders. Hugoton aims to transmit
and sell gas in Kansas, 2a5 which uses "fair value" regulation.230 Presumably
Kansas will now allow Panhandle's investors a fair return on the "fair value"
of property which under the FPC would have earned a return only on its cost.
After a pipeline has sold its producing property it may later buy gas, to meet
its own requirements, at a field price higher than the allowance it would have
received on its own production. Consumers would foot the difference.
In the past the FPC has not scrutinized carefully the propriety of particular
expenditures; rather it has been satisfied that expenditures actually were
320 U.S. 591, 649 (dissenting) (1943); Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581, 610
(1944) (concurring).
232. See Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1944); Panhandle Easteri
Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 635, 648 and n.8 (1944).
233. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 2, at 456 (Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.); id. at
467 (Union Producing Co., an affiliate of United Gas Pipe Line Co.). Such a "market
price" or "value" allowance was one of the chief aims of the pre-Kerr bill proposals to
amend the Natural Gas Act. See note 85 supra.
The obvious defect of this proposal is the danger of price rigging. Since the pipelines
are the chief outlet for producers, the prices they pay largely determine the average field
prices. Allowing them the average field price for their own production would encourage
them to increase their return by raising the prices paid to independents. See SMxTu-Wmr,(-
BERLY REP. 223-5. There seems little safeguard against this in the proposal of Federal
Power Commissioners Smith and Wimberly that the pipelines' production allowance be
based on the "weighted average" of contract prices in the field. Id. at 235.
234. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 635, 648 and n.8 (1944).
235. FPC v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co., 337 U.S. 498, 500-1, 519-20 (1947).
236. FPC, op. cit. supra note 51, at 8, Table B.
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made.2 37 Since this assures recovery of virtually all costs,ms the high-cost
prospector turns out to be a fortunate fellow whose mistakes are rewarded by
the rate subsidies of the consumers. This might tempt an independent pro-
ducer to spend money for the purpose of enlarging his rate base.3 9
Interstate pipeline-producers are continuing to add to their producing acre-
age despite greatly increased purchase costs.2 40  With today's enormous de-
mand for natural gas it may be difficult for the FPC to determine whether a
given expenditure for producing acreage is a reflection of its current market
value or attempt by the purchaser to increase the net investment rate base on
which he receives his return.
In the face of attempts by pipeline-producers to inflate their rate bases, the
FPC would probably begin to insist that expenditures be "legitimate" as well
as "actual." The objection that this would interfere with the prerogatives of
management might be easily brushed aside.-241 But the Commission could not
237. E.g., Inl fatter of Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 3 F.P.C. 32, 43 P.U.R. (N.S.) 205,
215 (1942) (write-up of acreage on'its transfer from one affiliate to another), afflrmed, Col-
orado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1944).
238. See SMITH-WIIBERLY REP'. 198-201. Nevertheless independents persisted in com-
plaining, throughout Congressional consideration of the Kerr bill and its predecessors,
that the FPC does not allow capitalization of unsuccessful exploration and drilling. E.g.,
Hearings, supra note 2, at 120-1, 128-9. This was flatly contradicted by the FPC. E.g., id.
at 325.
239. See SMITH-,VIBERLY REP. 203-9. The only clear limitations on thus enlarging
the rate base would be the amount of money the company could scrape up, and its fear of
spending too much for acreage where the chance of finding gas is highly speculative. Yet
if made in good faith even a sour investment should under FPC regulation be redeemed by
consumers.
240. Hearings, supra note 2, at 316, 320.
An example of the high prices currently being paid for producing property by inter-
state pipelines is a recent purchase by the El Paso Natural Gas Co. Early in 1949 El Paso,
planning a new line from the southwest to California, contracted to buy a large volume of
gas from the Delhi Oil Corp. The contract gave Delhi the right to cancel if it were
brought under FPC control. 96 CoNG. REc. 3658 (Mar. 20, 1950). The FPC ruled that
under its Order No. 139, supra note 86, this sale would not subject Delhi to its jurisdiction.
FPC Rides No Jurisdiction it Delhi Gas Sale Proposal, On. & GAS J. 201 (Mar. 17, 1949).
Later, in a letter to Sen. Hayden of Arizona, the FPC indicated that Delhi might come
under its jurisdiction. When Delhi cancelled its contract with El Paso the pipeline con-
tracted to buy gas rights in the necessary acreage. 96 CONG. R c. 3658-9 (Mar. 20, 1950).
Under this contract El Paso acquired gas rights on 13,630 acres for '$3 million plus an over-
riding royalty of 5 to 7 cents per thousand cubic feet of treated gas. Delhi reserved the
oil rights in the land. Delhi Sells Holdings, OIL & GAS J. 164 (Jan. 26, 1950).
Presumably El Paso will receive a return on the $3 million in its rate base, and will
also be allowed as operating expenses the royalties paid to Delhi. Compare this with the
earlier situations in the cases cited note 230 supra.
241. When state commissions have attempted to disallow certain operating expenses as
"improper" utilities have argued that this is an interference with management's rights.
This objection has been circumvented by the theory that commissions are not actually for-
bidding the challenged operating expenses. The commissions are simply exercising their
accounting control in not allowing utilities to record certain outlays as operating expenses.
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treat lightly the practical difficulties of determing what expenditures are "legiti-
mate." While the FPC may be able to keep its eye on the cost of building giant
pipelines here and there, it would not be so easy to watch the cost of buying
up and drilling cow pastures all over Texas.' 24 If the FPC's cost method is ex-
tended to include the independents, these difficulties will increase.
Conservation and allocation. Any program for fixing maximum field
prices may thwart the long-range conservation of natural gas. Limiting field
prices would probably call for a corresponding check in end rates to consumers,
with the result of sustaining demand. But is it desirable to encourage the rapid
exploitation of the country's gas reserves ?243 During the last generation oil
and gas have furnished a growing share of the country's energy requirements
at the expense of coal.244 Yet gas reserves are running roughly a scant 80 years
ahead of production; oil reserves, about 12. Coal deposits, on the other hand,
will last several thousand years.245
With these facts the following dismal picture has been painted: The steady
piping of gas all over the country will drain the southwest of a fuel resource
needed to encourage the development of industry in that region? 0  The in-
creasing use of gas and oil may wreck the coal industry and perhaps cripple the
railroads which count heavily on coal for freight. When gas and oil peter out
the coal industry will have to be revived. Perhaps twice in a lifetime there will
be great social distress following the shift from one fuel supply to another.2 17
These gloomy prospects have turned FPC and Congressional hearings into
battlegrounds for various pressure groups seeking or opposing federal action.2 8
See BARNES, op. cit. supra note 52, at 605. A similar rationale would support disallowance
of amounts originally spent in acquiring property. See also the discussion of over-invest-
ment in unoperated oil acreage in Re United Fuel Gas Co., 1918C P.U.R. 193, 208-9 (1918).
242. See SMITH-WIMERLY REP. 209.
243. For pessimistic views of the effects of unrestricted exploitation of gas reserves see
BLACHLY & OATMAN, NATURAL GAS AND THE PumIC INTEREST c. 9 (1947); DRAPER-
OLDS REP. 27-115. A more optimistic view is expressed in ROSTow, A NATIONAL POLICY
FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY 31-33 (1948).
244. In 1920 coal supplied 75 per cent of the nation's energy, oil about 15 per cent, and
natural gas about 5. By 1946 the respective contributions were approximately 45, 30 and
15 per cent. SMITH-WmBERLY REP. 315, chart 2. And by 1949 coal's share of energy
consumption was down to 38.5 per cent. Bureau of Mines estimate, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8,
1950, p. 29, col. 4.
245. SMITH-WIMBERLY REP. 307 (estimates in 1946).
246. See DRAPER-OLDs REP. 33-49, 61-74.
247. See BLACHLY & OATMAN, op. cit. mspra note 243, at 122-5; SMITH-WIMBERLY
REP. 300-2.
248. The Natural Gas Act of 1938 required interstate pipelines to obtain certificates of
public convenience and necessity from the FPC for expanding their service only when a
pipeline proposed to enter a market already served by another pipeline. 52 STAT. 821, § 7(c)
(1938). This prevented the FPC from considering the economic effects of natural gas dis-
placement of coal markets and railroad freight. See H. REP. No. 1290, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2-3 (1941). In 1942 the Act was amended to give the FPC jurisdiction over all inter-
state pipeline facilities. The Commission could determine the service area in which a
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The crisis that would follow the exhaustion of natural gas may be avoided
-without further government intervention in the industry. WArhile oil and gas
reserves are limited at any one date, the increase in reserves has so far out-
stripped demand. And there is no reason to suppose that the end is yet in sight.
Future discoveries, however, can merely postpone the exhaustion of reserves;
they will not avoid it. The long-range answer to the fuel problem lies in attacks
on the cost of mining coal,249 of synthesizing gas and oil from coal, ° of re-
covering oil from shale, 251 and extracting liquid fuel from peat. 25- And around
pipeline was to operate and the pipeline could expand its facilities within such area without
further authorization. 56 STAT. 83, § 7(c), (f) (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 717c, f (1946).
Though requested to determine service areas for the pipelines, the FPC continued to
conduct hearings on each proposed extension of facilities. In these hearings the railroads
and coal companies, as well as labor unions in both fields, have been allowed to intervene
in opposition to natural gas expansion. See Hearings before House Committec on Inter-
state Commerce on H. R. 2185, 2235, 2292, 2569, and 2956, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 211-262
(1947).
The problem of natural gas competition with other fuels was the subject of an FPC in-
vestigation in 1945-6. See note 8 supra. The results of the study appeared in two sep-
arate reports. Commissioners Smith and Wimberly expressed no views about the w.sdom
of unrestricted fuel competition. See SLIIThI AV.IBERLY REP. 351-9. They did, how-
ever, recommend certain amendments of the Natural Gas Act to expedite action on pipe-
line applications for service extensions. See id. at 494-5. But Commissioners Draper and
Olds based their report on the thesis that natural gas is an irreplaceable resource whose un-
limited export from the southwest will hinder the economic development of that region.
DRAP R-OLDs REPORT 61-74. They advocated FPC consideration of the end use to
which natural gas may be put in granting certificates to pipelines. Id. at 12-13.
The Rizley bill of 1947, see supra note 85, would have allowed pipelines to extend
service in existing markets without obtaining permission from the FPC, and would also
have barred the Commission from restricting the type of end use of gas. Hearings, supra,
at 3. This was supported by pipelines, id. at 211, by independent producers, id. at 126, 155-7,
512, by some local distributing companies, id. at 298-300, and also by communities and in-
dustrial users who wanted more gas. See letters printed id. at 517-31. On the other hand
the Rizley measure was opposed by many distributing companies fearing the competition of
pipeline sales made direct to industry, id. at 536-8, and by communities which feared ex-
pansion of gas service would curtail their supply, id. at 516, 519. Also opposing the bill
were the railroads, id. at 484-505, and railway workers, id. at 509-10. The coal interests
introduced a bill of their own that would have declared a fuel policy allowing the FPC to
protect their markets. H.R. 2569, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
249. There are two phases to this attack. One is the development of new mining equip-
ment. See Continuous Coal Mining, Fortune, June 1950, p. 11. The other is the develop-
ment of underground gasification of coal: burning coal in the ground and drawing off the
gas. See Engel, Coal Without Shovels, 170 NATION 202 (1950); Skrotzki, Underground
Gasification Goes on Second Trial at Gorgos, Power, April 1949, p. 79.
250. The cost of conversion is now the only reason for using oil and gas in their natural
state. A brief account of the technical and economic aspects of making gas from coal is
found in SmITH-1VIMBERLY RE P. 445-64.
251. See Roberts and Schultz, Production of Liquid Fuels front Oil Shale, OIL & GAS
J. 16 (Sept. 15, 1949).
252. Peat reserves may exceed those of coal. See Linz, Liquid Fuiel From Peat, Omg &
GAs J. 47 (April 6, 1950).
1509
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the comer, at an uncertain distance, lies the commercial development of atomic
energy.
However long natural gas resources may last, FPC control of field prices
would affect the allocation of supplies. Some people have argued, for instance,
that field prices should be held down to provide cheap fuel for encouraging in-
dustrial development in the southwest.2 53 But a flat cut in field prices would
give outside industries a "free ride," too. Other people have therefore urged
that field prices be kept up or even be boosted to discourage cheap industrial
consumption outside the producing states.254 But this action would also dis-
courage industrial consumption in the southwest. These conflicting aims could
be reconciled by adopting discriminatory prices-low for southwest consump-
tion, higher for outside use.2 55 Such a price differential would find producers
reluctant to sell in the southwest. To overcome their reluctance the govern-
ment might have to subsidize southwestern sales or boost rates for other areas
high enough to force those areas out of the market.
CONCLUSION
Solution of the problem of rising field prices of natural gas demands a
thorough investigation to light many dark corners. The causes of the price
phenomenon must be sought out. Possible monopoly elements should be un-
covered. Competitive forces which tend to limit prices need to be appraised
and balanced against price lifting pressures. Should investigation disclose that
normal market forces will not keep prices within reason and prevent monopoly
profits, government regulation should be undertaken. This regulation would
inevitably affect the rate and character of natural gas consumption. Whether
field prices should be manipulated deliberately to alter consumption patterns
and whether Congress or the FPC should make this decision are further ques-
tions to be determined.
On the basis of present knowledge FPC regulation of independents' prices
would be imprudent. It would also be an extension of authority into an area
where Congress has never deliberately considered, let alone sanctioned regula-
tion. Should the FPC attempt field price regulation without a legislative man-
date, Congress should block the move.
253. DRAPER-OLDs REP. 150-2, 157.
254. Cf. BLACHLY AND OATMAN, Op. cit. supra note 243, at 38-40, 146, 158-9.
255. At least this is a theoretical possibility. To put it into operation might require an
amendment of the Natural Gas Act, which now forbids natural gas companies to "main-
tain any unreasonable difference in rates ...either as between localities or as between
classes of service." 52 STAT. 822, § 4 (1938) as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 717e (1946).
Whether an amendment would be necessary depends on the interpretation of "unreasonable."
Present price differentials between classes of service (domestic as against industrial, for
example) are not per se "unreasonable." This might also be true of a price differential
based on a policy of promoting regional development.
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